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ABSTRACT 
In order for information to move efficiently in 
asymmetric combat environments the military has had to 
flatten its organization and find ways to network those 
decision makers who impact the ebb and flow of events on 
the ground day to day. This thesis further develops the 
concept of Marine Corps distributed operations (DO) under 
the current Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) structure. 
Analysis will focus on the integration of traditional RF 
nets into a networked based architecture using emerging 
Commercial off the Shelf (COTS) Radio Frequency to Internet 
Protocol (RF to IP) technologies that would further advance 
the Marine Corps’ MAGTF capabilities.   
Evaluations include traditional Marine Corps ground 
radio assets along with COTS equipment.  Tests include 
laboratory and field settings.  Key performance measures 
include interoperability, bandwidth measurements, range and 
power consumption.  Additional measures include 
interoperability with current internet protocol networks 
and methods of execution. 
Findings demonstrate gateway of military tactical 
ground radios into IP networks or into other IP enabled 
communication devices are feasible. Radio interoperability 
is investigated over various network medium such as IEEE 
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1I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND  
Today our armed services are engaged in the Global War 
on Terrorism where the enemy is adaptive, dispersed and 
organized to exploit our weaknesses.  The unconventional 
means our adversaries use require the United States to 
employ all of its resources and leverage its technological 
superiority to combat this deadly enemy.  The wars in Iraq 
and Afghanistan have changed how we command and control our 
forces.  Information on the battlefield can be the 
determining factor of who wins or loses these conflicts.  
Determining who receives the right information and when is 
key when fighting an unconventional foe that is constantly 
looking for gaps or weaknesses to exploit to his advantage. 
Change is nothing new to the military.  Each conflict 
in our nation’s history has driven tremendous technological 
change.  “The Information Age” is making distance less 
relevant.  Information, and the decisions that result, can 
travel almost instantaneously to the place(s) where they 
are needed, making the location of those who gather, 
analyze, make decisions and possibly those who act on these 
decisions largely irrelevant.”1 The military is constantly 
looking for ways to deliver critical information to the 
decision maker charged with operational and tactical 
objectives.  In order for information to move efficiently 
in asymmetric combat environments the military has had to 
find ways to network those decision makers who impact the 
ebb and flow of events on the ground day to day.  By 
                     1 Alberts, Garstka, Stein. Network Centric Warfare: Developing and 
Leveraging Information Superiority, Washington D.C.: CCRP Publication 
Series, February 2000. 
2enabling the warfighter to receive and send more 
information they can better adapt to the complex 
battlefield environment.  
Currently our military is looking for new ways to help 
the warfighter become more lethal by equipping him with 
tools to improve the decision making process and thereby 
moving faster than an enemy can react.  These tools however 
bring another layer of complexity to the fight. Each new 
technology brings with it an outlay of more money, more 
time and more training for those intended to be helped by 
them.  For the military, sometimes technology moves faster 
than what can be realistically fielded.  Legacy systems 
that have proven effective in the past must be used in new 
and creative ways. In order to bridge the gap between old 
and new, the military must take an adaptive approach to end 
systems and while exploiting new technologies. 
On April 25,th 2005, General Michael W. Hagee, 33rd 
Commandant of the Marine Corps, introduced a new concept 
called Distributed Operations (DO). Since this time a large 
effort has been made by the Marine Corps to make this 
concept a reality.  A renewed focus on Marine Corps small 
unit leaders (platoon and lower) has forced the Marine 
Corps to take a hard look at its current command and 
control systems and look for realistic ways to make the DO 
concept a reality. 
During Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation 
Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the Marine Corps’ maneuver warfare 
philosophy was solidified with maximum decentralization of 
decision-making guided by commander’s intent.  The concept 
of Distributed Operations (DO) is the deliberate use of 
separation and coordinated, interdependent, tactical 
3actions enabled by increased access to functional support, 
as well as enhanced combat capabilities at the small-unit 
level. 
Small units such as, infantry companies and platoons 
are no longer expected to only conduct traditional military 
operations but more dynamic missions that execute in a 
disaggregated fashion dispersed beyond the normal range of 
mutually supporting organic direct fires, but linked 
through a command and control network (C2).  The intent of 
DO is not to replace traditional capabilities but rather 
enhance them to help shape battlespace. 
The Marine Corps is in the process of developing the DO 
concept into future warfighting capabilities that still 
focus on the Marine Corps’ core competencies of maneuver 
warfare.  Marine Corps Warfighting Lab (MCWL) is currently 
conducting Limited Objective Experiments (LOE) that put to 
test current capabilities and develop future requirements 
for DO.  
This research focuses on equipping the DO platoon with 
improved C2 assets. This thesis addresses the communication 
concerns of the experimental platoon conducting distributed 
operations training and reveals the shortcomings of the 
current command and control architecture.  It identifies 
the concept of operations and how communications become an 
enabling or limiting factor. Research efforts address new 
technologies intended to leverage current command and 
control systems a DO platoon currently possess.  Additional 
research also addresses network architectures and new 
commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) devices that may 
realistically allow the warfighter to have the information 
he requires. 
4This project is a continuation of ongoing research 
that began in June 2006.  The NPS Distributed Operations 
Working Group began studying this concept and began a 
series of laboratory and field experiments intended to 
solve many of the command and control challenges faced by 
DO.  A collaborative effort by another disparate research 
group with similar research goals was established to help 
consolidate resources and intellectual expertise. 
B. OBJECTIVES 
The primary objective of this research is to 
demonstrate how the current and future DO communications 
architecture can be leveraged into an IP (Internet 
Protocol) network environment.  The research investigates 
the use of Twisted Pair WAVETM server technology to bridge 
legacy RF (Radio Frequency) communications equipment into a 
tactical internet in order to determine the capabilities 
and limitations it provides a DO force and supporting 
units.  
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS    
1. Can current legacy radios being proposed by MCWL 
for DO platoons be used on a routable IP tactical network?  
How specifically does a current VHF/UHF radio used by 
operating forces link to an IP network infrastructure?  
What significant capability does this provide? 
2.  Can IEEE 802.16 wireless backbone network 
architectures be extended to traditional legacy radio 
equipment?  For example, can a commander of a DO unit make 
a digital phone call from a VoIP (Voice over Internet 
Protocol) type phone to a legacy VHF/UHF radio?  What  
 
 
5capability does this provide a Marine infantry battalion 
operating in dispersed operating environment where units 
are separated 50-100km? 
3. What are the security considerations with regards 
to RF – IP?   
D. SCOPE 
 The scope of this thesis will include: 
 An analysis of the current and proposed DO 
command and control architectures.   
 A review of MCWL’s Limited Objective Experiment 2 
(LOE2) and the communication challenges it 
reveals.  Additionally analysis of on site survey 
results as administered in May of 2006 to the DO 
experimental platoon. 
 A review of RF to IP (Radio Frequency to Internet 
Protocol) COTS equipment and how it can leverage 
current legacy radio assets into an IP network 
environment. 
 Field experimentation to test USMC radio 
equipment and its interoperability with COTS RF-
to-IP technology.   
E. METHODOLOGY 
1. Research USMC Distributed Operations 
publications, articles and related material. 
2. Conduct Marine Corps Warfighting Lab (MCWL) site 
visits.  Interview key personnel and conduct limited survey 
to identify areas of concern regarding the command and 
control of a distributed operations unit. 
63. Research RF to IP technologies, related reference 
material and industry experts.  Additionally read relevant 
and recent NPS thesis research related to command and 
control systems and Distributed Operations. 
4. Perform laboratory and field tests to determine 
key performance measures. 
F. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS 
CHAPTER I. This chapter discusses the problem and 
provides background information on the command and control 
challenges posed by Distributed Operations. The problem 
addresses the reason for conducting this research, and 
provides a framework in which the reader can have context. 
CHAPTER II. This chapter further defines the 
concept of Distributed Operations and identifies its 
command and control challenges.  This chapter also 
highlights the current and proposed communication 
architecture for Distributed Operations.  Here MCWL site 
visit observations are discussed and analyzed.  
CHAPTER III.  This chapter discusses what laboratory 
and field experiments where conducted as well as the 
results obtained. This chapter provides an in-depth 
analysis of RF-to-IP technology and how it integrates into 
the current and proposed DO command and control 
architecture.  Additionally, a detailed review of the COTS 
technology used in this thesis is examined and researched. 
CHAPTER IV. This chapter discusses the external 
supporting factors affecting Distributed Operations.  It 
identifies command and control issues and how a Marine 
Corps would integrate RF-to-IP technology into its current  
 
7command and control architecture.  It also addresses how 
this technology can be used throughout the tactical 
network. 
CHAPTER V. This chapter provides a conclusion for 
the research study as well as articulates areas that 
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9II. DISTRIBUTED OPERATIONS CONCEPT OF 
OPERATIONS 
A. OVERVIEW 
Distributed Operations describes an evolving concept 
that seeks to maximize the MAGTF commander’s ability to 
employ tactical units across the depth and breadth of a 
nonlinear battlespace, in order to achieve favorable 
intelligence-driven engagements as part of the Joint Force 
Commander’s overall campaign. A robust and easily 
accessible C4 backbone and prompt, responsive joint fires 
enable this capability.  
Distributed operations constitute an additive 
capability.2 In simple terms, this means that DO will do 
nothing to degrade the time-honored core competency of 
Marine infantry to “locate, close with, and destroy” our 
Nation’s enemies, wherever they may find them. “As dictated 
by current or anticipated national strategy and tactical 
situation, the MAGTF’s fully netted DO capable forces will 
alternately disperse or mass to best exploit any 
opportunity our adversaries offer.”3 
Understanding the concept of Distributed Operations is 
important.  Equally important is to understand what 
Distributed Operations is not.  A Marine DO platoon is not 
a special operations or reconnaissance unit.  Although 
those entities may perform distributed operations in 
                     2 The term “additive capability” is a term used to describe the 
Marine Corps Maneuver Warfare doctrine and builds upon the unique 
competencies and the extensive capabilities that Marines already 
provide to the Joint warfighting community. 
3 Marine Corps Warfighting Lab. “Questions and Answers about 
Distributed Operations.” Internet: 
http://www.mcwl.usmc.mil/SV/DO%20FAQs%2016%20Mar%2005.pdf, March 20, 
2005 [October 9, 2006]. 
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conjunction with their mission, Marine DO units will not 
give up their conventional capabilities must have while 
conducting DO.  It is merely an additive capability which 
requires additional training and skill development to small 
unit leaders. 
B. TABLE OF ORGANIZATION/TABLE OF EQUIPMENT 
1. Organization:  The experimental Distributed 
Operations (DO) capable platoon is based on a standard 
Marine Corps Infantry Rifle Platoon of 1 officer, 42 
enlisted Marines, and the standard attachment of 1 
Corpsman. The rank and basic T/O weapons distribution 
generally remain the same; some crew served weapons are 
added to the organic structure. The task organization of 
the platoon for DO is outlined below in Figure 1:  
 
 
Figure 1.   Organization of DO Platoon. (From: [4]) 
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2. Communications Equipment:  For the purpose of 
this research, equipment other than communications will not 
be discussed.  Current infantry rifle platoons operate with 
only one VHF radio by Table of Equipment (T/E) allowance.  
Squads traditionally do not have radios.  DO capable 
platoons are equipped with a significant communications 
suite.  Table 1 describes the type of communications 
equipment currently used by DO. 
 
Table 1.   Communications Equipment and Capabilities (From: 
[4]) 
 
The DO capable platoon will be able to talk over-the-
horizon (around the world) via standard TACSAT 
communications and the Expeditionary Tactical 
Communications System (ETCS). In addition, the squad will 
have the organic capability to communicate in VHF and UHF, 
and the platoon will also have an HF capability.  
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Because of this additional amount of communications 
equipment, a DO platoon has an enormous capacity to 
communicate over great distances even within the platoon.  
Figure 2 describes how the communications equipment is 
dispersed within the command elements of the platoon.  
Figure 3 describes the squad outlay. 
 
Figure 2.   Communication Equipment for DO Command 









C. LEGACY SYSTEMS OVERVIEW  
1. AN/PRC-117F Multi-band, Multi-mission Man-pack 
Radio  
The PRC-117F (See Figure 4) is an emerging radio 
system within the Marine Corps.  It was initially fielded 
to support ground-air operations. Since the beginning of 
the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, these radios have 
increasing become popular among conventional units.  DO 
calls for each individual squad to operate the PRC-117F.  
The radio’s multiband capability enables the squad to use 
satellite communications.  A breakdown of the PRC-117F 







Figure 4.   AN/PRC-117F. (From: [13]) 
 
 Covers entire 30 to 512 MHz frequency range while 
offering embedded COMSEC, SATCOM, and ECCM 
capabilities.  
 Secure interoperability with SINCGARS (MIL-STD 
188-220)  
 Can be configured for man-pack, vehicular and 
base station applications suitable for operation 
in a multimode service environment.  
 Comparable in size to the AN/PRC-119  
 Interoperable with legacy encryption systems and 
acts as a translator between otherwise 
incompatible radios. The hardware can be 
reconfigured and software reprogrammed to 
optimize performance and add capabilities without 







 Capable of transmitting in VHF single channel, 
VHF frequency-hopping, Ultra High Frequency 
(UHF), and in tactical satellite Tactical 
Satellite (TACSAT) modes.4  
 
2. AN/PRC-119F Single Channel Ground Air Radio 
System (SINCGARS)  
The PRC-119F (See Figure 5) is the primary radio used 
by Marine Corps ground units today.  It is interoperable 
with several SINCGARS variants and is the primary radio 
used by ground forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Of note, 
this radio doesn’t possess any IP networking capabilities.  
It was designed primarily for voice traffic but can 
facilitate some data communications on a very limited 
scale.  Radio characteristics are listed below. 
 
Figure 5.   AN/PRC 119F (From: [10]) 
 
 30-88 MHz VHF-FM 
 2320 Channels 
 Single channel and Frequency Hopping (FH)                      4 Note: Using TACSAT in the dedicated mode, with a channel dedicated 
to use of one element with a simple uplink and downlink, is much easier 
than using TACSAT in the Demand Assigned Multiple Access (DAMA) mode. 
DAMA requires more programming and every entry must be correct or 
communications on the satellite will be denied by the controlling 
authority.  
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 6 FH presets (including TRANSEC keys) 
 6 Single channel presets plus manual and cue channels 
 Enhanced data mode (BPS)1200, 2400, 4800, 9600 
 Standard data mode (BPS) 600, 1200, 2400, 4800,16,000 
 Power Output 4.5 watts nominal 
 Less than 8 pounds with embedded battery 
 33-hr. battery life (6:3:1 duty cycle with BA-5590 
battery) 
 Jam-resistant communications 
 Primary Power +13V <1.5A 
 Standard Batteries BA-5590, BB-390 (rechargeable) 
 
3. AN/PRC-148 Multiband Inter/Intra Team Radio 
(MBITR)  
The PRC-148 (See Figure 6) is a multiband radio 
(VHF/UHF) used primarily for squad to platoon 
communications.  This radio system enables a DO squad to 
conduct Close Air Support (CAS) missions as required.  
This radio has many of the same capabilities as the PRC-
117F.  The main difference is its weight and power 
output.  It’s intended for command and control within the 
platoon and is used extensively throughout the Marine 
Corps.  A more detailed list of its capabilities is 







Figure 6.   AN/PRC-148 (MBITR) (From: [11]) 
 
 30 to 512 MHz Frequency Coverage  
 5 and 6.25 kHz Step Size  
 Rapid Start-up Time  
 Less than 30.6 ounces  
 AM/FM  
 Voice/Data  
 HAVEQUICK I/II, SINCGARS ESIP Single Channel and 
Frequency Hopping, ANDVT  
 Selectable RF Output Power (0.1 to 5 watts)  
 Analog Narrowband Capable (12.5 kHz)  
 2 and 20 Meter Immersible Variants  
 AM and FM Synchronous Data Rates of 12 and 16 
kbps  
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 AM and FM Asynchronous Data Rates below 4800 baud  
 Retransmission Between Handheld Radios (with 
special purpose filters and cable)  
 Joint Interoperability Test Center (JITC) Tested  
 Encryption - NSA Endorsed Type I & Type III DES  
 
4. AN/PRC 150C High Frequency Radio  
The PRC-150C (Figure 7) resembles the PRC-117F and 
has many of the same program features.  However this 
system is primarily HF it is capable of extending its 
range up to 60 MHz.  It is intended for over the horizon 
(OTM) long-range ground communications.  This system does 
have limited ability to pass digital communications but 
is not used for this purpose within the DO construct. 
 
 
Figure 7.   AN/PRC-150C HF RADIO (From: [13]) 
 
 
 Frequency Range 1.6 to 59.999 MHz 
 Net Presets 75, fully programmable 
 Emission Modes J3E (single sideband, upper or 
lower, suppressed carrier telephony) 
 Power Input 26 VDC (21.5 to 32 VDC) 
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 Radio Weight 10 lb (4.7 kg) without batteries 
 Encrypted Data HF: MIL-STD-188-110B App. C 
(9600bps and 12,800 bps uncoded), 
 NSA-certified U.S. Type 1 encryption. 
 Automatic Link Establishment (ALE) provides 
faster and more reliable linking and increased 
data link throughput, even in degraded channel 
conditions. 
 Advanced frequency hopping (ECCM) allows secure 
communications in the presence of jamming. 
  
5. Personal Role Radio (PRR)  
The PRR radio (Figure 8) is intended to connect all 
DO platoon members within relative close proximity of 
each other.  There is no Type 1 encryption available for 
this system but the system relies on Direct Sequence 
Spread Spectrum (DSSS) frequency modulation and low power 
for Low Probability of Detection/Low Probability of 
Intercept (LPD/LPI).  Of note, the radio can be 
configured (dual mode) to work with the other tactical 
radios so that a user can switch from inter-team to 
inter-squad communications.  Additionally the wireless 
Push-to-Talk (PTT) allows users to key the radio without 
moving their hand from their weapon system.  The main 
purpose for this radio is inter-team communication. 
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Figure 8.   PERSONAL ROLE RADIO (PRR) (From: [14]) 
 
 50mW transmit power using Direct Sequence Spread 
Spectrum modulation at 2.4GHz 
 Typical operating range is 500m in open terrain, 
and through 3 floors of a building or through 5 
houses in Urban environments 
 Wireless Press to Talk with up to 2m range 
 256 channels, 16 available directly to the user. 
 Operates from 2 x AA batteries for greater than 
24 hours (1:7:16 Tx/Rx/Standby) 
 Operates independently of any infrastructure 
 NBC Compatible 
 
6. EXPEDITIONARY TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM 
(ETCS)  
ETCS (Figure 9) provides voice and data 
communications either over-the-horizon (OTH) or on-the-
move (OTM).  The system is a modified version of the Low 
Earth Orbit (LEO) Iridium satellite system that provides 
netted (one to many) push-to-talk communications.  The 
handset is a modified Motorola 9505 handset with an 
integrated GPS and Group Radio Controller to manage the 
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voice/data traffic and individual nets.  For DO it is 
mainly used for a Universal Fires Net where by all fire- 
capable entities can communicate directly with the 
platoon.  The system experiences a short delay due to the 
nature of delay in satellite communications. 
 
 
Figure 9.   ETCS (From: [15]) 
 
The ETCS system does experience unexpected outages.5  
This may create problems for users trying to call and 
adjust for supporting arms.  Outages can occur at any 
time thus making the system unpredictable. ETCS does 
provide some good utility despite its unpredictability.  
Its Position Location Indicator (PLI) function provides 
SA for entities that have the system connected to C2PC.  
A basic configuration is depicted in Figure 10.  Another 
problem is capacity.  The system has a limited amount of 
                     5 Comments regarding ETCS performance were obtained from MCWL LOE-2.   
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channels and is seen as a short-term solution by MCWL 
until either the technology is matured or improved. 
 
 
Figure 10.   ETCS Configuration (From: [15]) 
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D. COMMUNICATION CAPABILITIES 
1. Current Architecture  
The primary architecture is voice communications.  
ETCS does provide Position Location Information (PLI) but 
requires a second set of those systems to use.  
Additionally ETCS does have limited capacity and is a short 
term solution for the platoon.  ETCS is discussed in 
greater detail above.  Figure 11 describes the voice 
network for a DO capable platoon and how it communicates 
within the Marine Corps Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF).  
 
Figure 11.   DO Platoon Voice Network (From: [4]) 
 
The current architecture represents the current radio 
technologies available within the Marine Corps.  Of note 
there is no digital communications present.  Nor is there 
any significant way to bridge other communication assets 
with those fielded. 
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2. Proposed Architecture:   
The Marine Corps Warfighting Lab provided guidance to 
the NPS DO Working Group on their vision for DO.  It 
followed closely to current programs of record and listed 
possible devices that could be used by a DO platoon.   
Figure 12 illustrates the DO communication architecture. 
 
 
Figure 12.   DO Proposed Architecture (From: [5]) 
 
 
 MCWL’s DO concept does plan for increased mobility 
with the use of High Mobility Multi-Wheeled Vehicles 
(HMMWV) or Internally Transportable Vehicles (ITV) which 
could impact the use and type of communication equipment 
used.  However it was made clear by MCWL that mounted 
operations are but one of type of operation and any 
solution should not be vehicle-centric.   
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E. COMMUNICATION SHORTFALLS 
 The additional communications equipment afforded a DO 
capable platoon is quite impressive.  Rather than having 
one or two radio assets the platoon is equipped with many 
more.  Each Squad and Fireteam leader possesses the ability 
to communicate equally internally or externally as 
required.  However merely giving more radios to more 
Marines is only one way to improve information sharing.  
The current architecture does not bring any other 
significant information source into play.   
 Asymmetric warfare demands information superiority.  
Distributed Operations demands small unit leaders make 
tough decisions guided by commander’s intent, with the 
ability to disperse or aggregate as the mission requires.  
DO units must have shared awareness of the battlespace.  
This requires bringing critical information to those who 
can make the largest impact.   The authors believe this can 
be accomplished in a two prong approach.  First create and 
maintain a network that can harness and focus vital 
information to those who need it.  Then bring those who 
need the information into an established network and 
provide a path where information can flow at crucial times.  
Possibly a combination of both are the answer.  
 For Distributed Operations this means providing 
reliable, secure communications so foot-mobile infantry can 
carry equipment and power sources within their standard 
load, yet link to any joint element.   
Information vetted as intelligence must be freely 
available and constant. A voice network as depicted in 
Figure 12 only provides for one communication solution.  
MCWL does expand this by providing a netted low earth orbit 
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satellite communication-enabled system called ETCS, which 
delivers point to multipoint voice and PLI to a DO force.  
MCWL understands this system is a short term solution and 
is discussed in detail below. 
 The current DO platoon communications architecture 
provides little to no ability to send and receive data 
files, text messages, imagery, or video feeds outside the 
tactical command and control hierarchy.  For example, an 
element that has important information to share must funnel 
this information through the established organizational 
command structure.  Time sensitive items may not be 
disseminated appropriately, thus losing the tactical edge 
over the enemy.  The current architecture does not support 
any other network devices, which could assist distributed 
operations units.  Disparate radio frequency (RF) centric 
voice networks and associated end systems are not always 
capable of connecting to larger tactical networks.  
There appears to be little attempt to bridge legacy 
ground communication assets within an established data 
network.  The main reason appears to be the distances 
involved in conducting distributed operations.  Figure 12 
indicates Distributed Operations could operate up to 10 - 
100 kilometers away from other supporting or adjacent 
units.  This presents several challenges.  Logistics, joint 
fires and tactical support all hinge on reliable 
communications.   
DO units are provided two satellite communications 
alternatives which provide long range reach-back 
communications.  The PRC 117F and the ETCS are capable of 
providing this capability.  In reality these satellite 
communication assets could prove problematic since 
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satellite channels and availability are limited for 
tactical units.  The ETCS is not a fully fielded system 
therefore may be limited in scope and availability for a 
large architecture. 
F. JOINT TACTICAL RADIO SYSTEM (JTRS) 
Any discussion of communication shortfalls for DO 
would not be complete without investigating how the 
Department of Defense (DOD) has addressed military 
communications capabilities and shortfalls.  An enormous 
amount of research and development has been poured into 
tackling this issue.  This section examines why legacy 
radio systems will continue to be the mainstay for the 
Marine Corps in the near-term.  
 
Figure 13.   JTRS Operational Overview (From: [19]) 
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Each service had tried to develop service specific 
versions of programmable, modular, multi-mode, multi-band 
radios without much success.6   
Each service had experienced difficulty communicating 
other services in both Grenada and Desert Storm.  They were 
plagued by interoperability problems and limited bandwidth 
which did not meet expanding communication requirements.  
JTRS is a consolidated attempt to solve these problems. 
1. Mission Need 
The DOD sought to develop software-programmable 
tactical radios that would provide video, voice, and 
communications, with interoperability across several 
platforms. Current radio systems lack interoperability and 
have insufficient bandwidth to meet present and future 
communications challenges. The goal is an all service radio 
with the ability to provide mobile networked-connectivity 
across the battlespace.  
The question becomes, why is JTRS important?  The 
transformational effort of DOD’s architecture depends on 
the information infrastructure called the Global 
Information Grid (GIG). JTRS would extend the GIG to the 
least advantaged users and provide connectivity to those 
currently out of reach.    
2. Operational Requirements 
The JTR would enable military commanders the ability 
to command and control their forces more effectively by 
providing more services such as voice, video, and data.  
The goals established by the Defense Planning Guidance 
                     6 Joint Program Executive Office (JPEO) for Joint Tactical Radio 
System (JTRS) February 2006. PDF Document, JTRS Overview.  Internet: 
http://enterprise.spawar.navy.mil/body.cfm?type=c&category=27&subcat=60
,[February 1, 2007]. 
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(1998–2003) and Joint Vision 2010 state that the, “JTR will 
perform in the most flexible manner and be designed as a 
family of advanced, reliable and dynamic communications 
platforms. As a result, the JTR will be software-
reprogrammable, multi-band/multi-mode capable, networkable, 
and provide simultaneous voice, data, and video 
communications.”7  The ground force version JTRS will 
provides surface-to-surface and surface-to-air 
communications. Command posts would use this system for 
command and control operationally.  The systems are 
intended to facilitate air missions, common operational 
picture (COP) and other sensor data.  Figure 14 depicts 
possible prototypes of JTRS radio. 
3. Technical Characteristics & Requirements 
The performance requirements for the JTRS radio are 
extensive.  The requirements were changed in 2005 to 
reflect mobile ad-hoc networking.  Here are but a few of 
the major requirements for JTRS:  
 The JTR architecture shall be capable of supporting 
secure and non-secure voice, video and data 
communications using multiple narrow-band and 
wideband waveforms.  
 The JTR program shall provide an internal growth 
capability through an open systems architecture 
approach in compliance with the Joint Technical 
Architecture, and shall be modular, scaleable, and 
flexible in form factor. 
 The JTR shall provide the operator with the ability 
to load and/or reconfigure modes/capabilities (via 
software) while in the operational environment.8 
                     7 SPAWAR Website, Operational requirements for JTR, Internet: 




 Figure 14.   Prototype JTRS Radio (From: [20]) 
 
 The JTR shall have the ability to be reconfigured 
(hardware changes/upgrades) in the operational 
environment. The JTR shall be capable of operating 
in a radio frequency spectrum from 2 MHz to 2 GHz. 
The JTR shall be capable of incorporating military 
and commercial satellite and terrestrial 
communications above 2 GHz. 
 The JTR shall have the ability to retransmit/cross-
band information between frequency bands/waveforms 
supported (threshold. 
 The JTR shall be capable of operating on multiple 
full and/or half-duplex channels at the same time.9 
 The Joint Requirements Oversight Council provided 
guidance to the JTRS operational requirements refinement.  
The intent was to fill gaps in the requirements that were 
identified by the operational stakeholders. For example, 
amendments to the Operational Requirements Document 
determined certain JTRS sets must be able to interface with 
a new satellite system called the Mobile User Objective 
                     9 SPAWAR Website, Operational requirements for JTR, Internet: 
http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/docs/jtr23_mar.htm [February 1, 
2007]. 
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System (MUOS).   Requirement changes like this have plagued 
the program and slowed development. 
4. Acquisition Strategy 
The JTRS program was restructured in 2005.  “The 
program plans to develop capabilities in increments rather 
than attempt to field a complete capability all at once, 
which was the previous approach.”10 The focus has shifted to 
networking capabilities using three new waveforms and 
interoperability with legacy radios. All changes keep in 
mind the DOD’s focus on network centric operations.  The 
list below gives examples of requirements that have been 
reduced:     
 Reduced number of waveforms: The number of waveforms 
to be delivered for the first increment has been 
reduced from 32 to 11. 
 Reduced number of radio variants: The number of 
variants to be delivered for the first increment has 
been reduced from 26 to 13. 
 Reduced number of waveform combinations per radio 
variant: The original intent of JTRS was that most 
waveforms would operate on most radio variants. 
However, DOD determined that porting 32 different 
waveforms onto 26 different variants would have been 
an immense and costly undertaking.11 
 
Figure 15 demonstrates the impact of the 
restructuring.  “This shift is reportedly expected to lower 
program risk from high to moderate, and to reduce 
development costs from $6 billion to about $4 billion.”12  
 
                     10 GAO DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS Restructured JTRS Program Reduces Risk, 




 Figure 15.   Impact of Restructuring on Product Schedules 
(From: [21]) 
 
5. Program Funding 
Because of program setbacks and delays, the 
procurement of legacy radio systems has dramatically 
increased.  “Since JTRS development will require at least 
several more years, it is likely that the estimated $11 
billion investment in legacy radios will continue to 
grow.”13 Table 2 shows the annual procurement amounts for 
radio systems other than JTRS from 1998 through 2006. 
 Table 2.   Procurement of Legacy Systems (From: [21]) 
                     13 GAO DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS Restructured JTRS Program Reduces Risk, 
but Significant Challenges Remain.  
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Most of the current program cost has predictably been 
in R&D.  Table 3 below shows the cost.  The unit cost has 
yet to be determined.   
 
Table 3.     JTRS Program Cost as of 2006 (From: [21]) 
 
6. Program Issues & Challenges 
There are several challenges ahead for the JTRS 
program. The program still faces management and technical 
challenges that must be overcome. Long-term commitments 
from stakeholders and service components have been lacking.  
Although the program has been restructured, certain 
assumptions about Wideband Networking Waveform have not 
been solidified.   However, “the program underestimated the 
complexity of meeting the Wideband Networking Waveform 
requirements and the services’ needs within the size, 
weight, and power constraints of the various user 
platforms.”14 As of the date of this thesis, JTRS still has 
not come out of the prototype phase. 
                     14 GAO DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS Restructured JTRS Program Reduces Risk, 
but Significant Challenges Remain. 
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7. Moving Ahead Without JTRS  
The Marine Corps is not waiting for JTRS to arrive.    
Several efforts are being made to increase the amount of 
bandwidth to tactical units deployed to Iraq.  The 
employment of commercial Support Wide Area Network (SWANS) 
(See Figure 16) has made dramatic increases in tactical 
data networking possible. 
 
Figure 16.   SWAN Terminal (From: 23) 
 
There are several iterations of the Support Wide Area 
Network employed in theater.  Currently there are VSWAN 
(Video) and LSWAN (Logistic) systems in Iraq with plans to 
provide 20 more (Ground) versions to Forward Operating 
Bases (FOB) and Mobile Training Teams (MTT).   
System description:  
 The major functional groups of the package are Ku-Band 
Very Small Aperture Terminal (VSAT) antenna, modem, 
routers, accelerators, KG-175/TACLANE, and Cisco Call 
Manager for SIPRNET Voice over Internet Protocol 
(Secure VoIP).  NIPRNET VoIP ready. 
 All equipment is packaged in transit cases which are 
all HMMWV transportable. 
 The Ku VSAT terminal is an auto-acquiring antenna. 
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 The modems are ViaSat Linkway IP, allowing hub and 
spoke or mesh architectures. 
 DISN services are accessed through the existing MNF-I 
tactical network.15 
 
Figure 17.   SWAN Architecture View (From:[22]) 
 
These systems provide commercial Ku band TDMA access 
and provide 32 MHz of bandwidth up to 25 Mbps to each 
terminal.  The same contractor (DATA PATH Corporation) is 
currently working with the U.S. Army.  Additionally the 
Marine Corps has employed terrestrial communications links 
to further extend access to digital communications.  
Accompanying each SWAN are two Wireless Point-to-Point Link 
(WPPL) IEEE 802.16 radios which provide up to 49Mbps of 
bandwidth. 
                     15 Chris Cox,and David Joseforsky.  GSWAN Brief. July 2006. 
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The authors believe this trend in Iraq will continue 
in the future.  Thus the trend of providing an increased 
networking capability to disadvantaged users on the 
battlefield will continue.  This capacity only previously 
afforded to higher echelons is currently reaching further 
down the organization.  Doctrine has not caught up with 
reality on the ground.  In chapter IV of this research the 
authors discuss how the communications T/E and its limited 
bandwidth at lower levels affect DO. 
8. Conclusion 
U.S. military forces lack interoperability and the 
capacity our information requirements demand.  It is clear 
the JTRS program has struggled from its inception. What is 
also clear is for distributed operations to work in the 
near-term, the Marine Corps can not wait for the JTRS 
solution.  Legacy systems will continue to be purchased and 
maintained until a suitable replacement becomes available.  
Until then, DO units must leverage what resources they now 
possess with emerging technologies. 
Due to the enormity of the JTRS program and the 
complexity of the system; it is unclear if even a new JTRS 
radio would even properly support DO units.  The Marine 
Corps’ DO concept does not specify a JTRS capability.  
However, it does pursue many of the same attributes the 
JTRS program is attempting to solve.  The JTRS program does 
not have a requirement to support DO type missions but the 
assumption could be made that a more interoperable, 
increased capability, inter-service radio would help in 
this endeavor.  The detailed architecture in which JTRS 
would operate in is not thoroughly well thought-out.  DO 
units not only require new communication systems to support 
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their mission but an architecture that is adaptive to 
changing conditions on the battlefield. It is the opinion 
of the authors simply giving a DO unit another new 
communication device with more capability is not the 
answer. 
G. MCWL 29 PALMS VISIT MAY 06 
1. Overview:  
While conducting research on this topic, one of the 
authors conducted a site one week visit to MCWL in 29 
Palms, California while they where conducting Limited 
Objective Experiment 2 (LOE2).  The author had access to 
the platoon and the staff conducting the experiment.  The 
intent of the visit was to observe communication challenges 
if any, and conduct a survey of the experiment 
participants.  
 
Figure 18.   DO Test Platoon and Supporting Staff 
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 The experiment ran from March 13th – May 25th.  The 
author arrived in the week prior to last of the experiment. 
The platoon used in the experiment came from 1st Platoon, 
Bravo Company, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines (40% combat 
veterans from Iraq) from Camp Pendleton.  It was the second 
test platoon to go through this experimental process, the 
first being 1st Battalion 3rd Marines from Kaneohe Bay, 
Hawaii during Limited Objective Experiment (LOE1), June 26 
– October 20, 2005.  The author had the opportunity 
interview the staff and platoon regarding communications, 
and those elements that dealt with command and control. 
2. General Observations 
The DO concept is still in the initial stages of 
development.  The communications infrastructure was RF only 
and proved challenging to implement.  Digital 
communications is not being pursued mainly because of the 
voice communication challenges posed by the desert 
environment.16  The Command and Control (C2) structure 
regarding Alpha/Bravo commands and its ideal execution 
still had some friction points.  There were no mobile 
platforms used in this experiment but some DO vehicles 
where on hand to inspect for their communications 
capabilities. 
Listed below are key insights from the trip: 
 The communications skill set is very basic.  The 
platoon does not have a dedicated 0621, only a 0311 
executing the communications voice network.17  Although 
                     16 Conversation with the experiment Communications Officer Major 
Lucus USMC.  Providing voice communications proved very challenging in 
29 Palms. 
17 0621 – Marine Occupation Specialty (MOS) Radio Operator.  0311 
designator for Infantry Marine. 
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many of the junior leaders are charged with the 
operation of radios, training appears to be very 
minimal.  It is important to note that this is not 
uncommon in the operating forces to have informally 
trained radio operators within Infantry Platoons.  
There is no radio operator billet designated with in 
the platoon. 
 Heavy reliance on Tactical Satellite Communications 
(TACSAT) as primary long haul communications system 
back to the TOC.  Used as a primary net for 
communications.  MCWL was granted 25K channel for use 
during the experiment.  This channel may not be always 
available in the operating forces given the limited 
capacity of narrow band SATCOM and use of DAMA (Demand 
Access Multiple Access) 
 The Platoon does not like to use High Frequency (HF) 
communications.  Mobility contradicts time to set up 
field expedient antennas used in desert environment.  
Radio operators not proficient on the manipulation of 
antennas for proper wave propagation. 
 Long range communications is the most significant 
problem with employment of C2 for the platoon.  The 
OTH (Over the Horizon) capability is thought to be a 
SATCOM LEO solution.  Terrestrial communications would 
be suspect given mountain environment 
 No data capability being employed and no push to have 
data down to the Platoon level or squad level.   
 ETCS is an unreliable communications platform which 
works by some reports only 60-70% of the time.  By 
most accounts from MCWL staff, the system will drop 
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connectivity for several periods (10 minutes) due to 
the rotation of the Iridium Satellite constellation.  
 
Figure 19.   Experimental Tactical Comm. System (ETCS) 
 
 The platoon currently employs one system for both 
the Alpha/Bravo Commands and one for each Squad.  
Batteries with an external source are good up to 
72 hours.  The systems are fragile and do break 
easily.  PLI (Position Location Information) is 
sent manually by changing channels.  
Communications via ETCS is virtually a long phone 
call that does not hang up while the operator has 
it enabled.   The system is relatively simple and 
easy to manipulate.  Operators must manually 
switch channels to give PLI information.  C2PC 
data resides at the COC. A screen displaying C2PC   
shows the current location of end users.  Time 
lags and delays are common.  Common census around 
MCWL is an “ETCS like” system is needed to fill 
this communications gap.18 
                     18 General conversation from MCWL staff believed communications 
solution with the positive attributes of ETCS was required, although 
the overall reliability and form-factor of the system was suspect. 
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 The Marines are weighed down immensely.  Some 
have 150lbs of gear.  One Marine weighed in at 
315lbs total weight.  His bodyweight is only 
160lbs.  Serious attention to weight must be 
considered before another piece of gear is 
proposed for the Marines to carry.  
 The platoon uses a small UAV call WASP (Figure 
18) for ISR only.  MCWL’s intent for this system 
is to remain purely a binocular “over the hill” 
capability for each squad.  The UAV is “sling-
shot” into the sky and is capable of sending 
real-time video feed to the ground operator.  The 
operator can view the images on a ground control 
unit or a Tough-book.  For the purposes of the 
experiment the DO Squads were not operating the 
UAV; rather school trained operators were on 
sight supporting the experiment. 
 
Figure 20.   Picture of WASP 
 
 
 Power is a major consideration.  Under the current 
DO construct, the platoon would not accommodate high 
power draw communication assets and the environment 
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would degrade the function of such assets.  However, 
without tactical vehicles or generators to provide 
power the ability to communicate could be hampered 
significantly using only man-packable devices. 
3. Platoon Survey 
a. Methodology 
A 15 question survey generated and administered 
to the platoon was developed by the authors (See APPENDIX 
A).  Its intent was to grasp the unfiltered responses from 
the experimental DO platoon regarding communications.  The 
responses then where entered into a web-based application 
called Survey Monkey allowing the authors to better 
quantify the results.  Additionally the respondents made 
narrative comments.  This provided the authors with key 
insights on how to pursue their research.  Once compiled, 
the results were given immediately to the MCWL staff for 
review. 
b. Survey Results and Conclusions:   
80% (34) of the 43 Marines in the DO platoon were 
available for the survey.  With only 80% of the platoon 
present for the survey, the authors believe the results are 
still accurate and worthy of analysis.  Those missing would 
have most likely responded in the Lcpl or PFC categories.   
The entire results of the survey are displayed in 
APPENDIX A.  For the purpose of this research, specific 
questions are addressed regarding communications.  Many of 
the survey participates did have written comments with each 
question.  The authors believe although relevant, reflect 
the choice response given by the participant and require no 
further analysis.  Here are the general trends:   
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 Most believe lack of suitable communications is 
the single biggest factor limiting the success of 
Distributed Operations.  The authors believe this 
stems from the recent communication challenges 
experienced by the platoon during the experiment. 
 Most believe that each Marine should have some 
sort of individual communications device but 
limit larger devices to one or two assets.  The 
Marines clearly understand the value of intra-
squad communications but believe larger VHF/UHF 
assets should be carried and monitored by a few 
individuals. 
 Many (55%) believed that each Marine should be as 
proficient regarding communications as they are 
with weapons systems.  Almost as many (41%) 
believed that only designated personnel should 
operate and maintain such equipment.  These 
responses may reflect the view that each Marine 
must understand all equipment but only 
responsible for specific equipment individually 
assigned. 
The lessons of the site visit validated the 
author’s assumption that the current and proposed 
communications architecture for DO is inadequate.  It also 
provided a framework in which to pursue methods and 
technologies that could help DO work more effectively.   
The DO platoon current and proposed 
communications equipment suite does give a great deal more 
communications capability than ordinary infantry platoons 
have.  The increased capability unfortunately increases 
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weight and logistic support needed to accommodate the 
suite.  Even with the increased capability, DO units still 
can not inter-network within the tactical internet used by 
the rest of DOD.  Because of the lack of interoperability 
of end-systems the Marine Corps still has not address how 
the larger network infrastructure supports DO.  Since none 
of the end-systems DO employs are routable networks, the 
authors see this as an unmet requirement. 
Since the current and proposed communications 
architecture for DO is not routable the authors see this as 
a severe gap and present little to solve joint fires, 
intelligence and C2 synchronization.  No other entity is 
tied into the DO communication network directly outside of 
the current T/O.19 Conversely the supporting communication 
unit (most cases the battalion communications platoon) for 
DO can do nothing to manage DO end-systems remotely. 
Each radio operates on specific frequencies for a 
particular reason.  By not bridging into a routable network 
the DO unit severely limits the ability of higher 
organizations to help support them directly.  For example, 
an intelligence shop, outside the T/O, with actionable 
intelligence for a DO unit does not have interoperability 
of end-systems in order to communicate with a DO unit, 
especially if they are separated physically outside the 
radio sphere.  As it stands today, the computer (end 
system) the intelligence analyst resides at can not 
communicate with the tactical radios in the field.  Even  
 
 
                     19 No other unit with the exception of line of sight (LOS) 
communication with aircraft for fire-support or casualty evacuation. 
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with the ETCS system providing PLI information for the COC, 
this information was not shared with any other entity on 
the network. 
The LOA-2 experiment in 29 Palms proved extremely 
challenging for the MCWL communication staff.  Long-haul 
communications provided the toughest challenge by far.  
Even if this hurdle is overcome, the ability to share voice 
communications through the tactical internet was neither a 
priority nor a requirement during the experiment.  The 
authors believe the tactical advantages of DO units are 
magnified by tying in multiple levels of the organization 
directly to tactical units on the ground.  Since current 
end-system is not designed for this operation, the authors 
see this as a capability gap as well. 
The authors believe a short-term solution to this 
problem is feasible.  If tactical radios could be 
integrated more effectively into the tactical internet then 
unmet requirements of interoperability of end-systems or 
routable networks could become reality.  Once legacy 
communication systems are successfully integrated into the 
larger tactical network then advances in technology could 
more readily replace those systems, communication systems 
that are designed specifically to be routable and 
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III. FIELD EXPERIMENTATION 
A. FIELD EXPERIMENT DISCUSSION 
The primary objective of this research is to 
demonstrate how the current and future DO communications 
architecture can be leveraged into an IP (Internet 
Protocol) network environment.  The research investigated 
the use of Twisted Pair WAVE Server technology to bridge 
legacy RF (Radio Frequency) communications equipment into a 
tactical internet in order to determine the capabilities 
and limitations it provides a DO force and supporting 
units.  
The authors took advantage of the quarterly NPS-
USSOCOM cooperative field research program also known as 
the tactical network topology (TNT) quarterly experiments. 
Additionally, a wireless network infrastructure exists and 
is maintained by NPS for ongoing field research. The 
infrastructure extends from NPS to Camp Roberts Air 
National Guard Base, approximately 100 miles away.  The 
network is connected via five IEEE 802.16 links and 
provides over 30 Mbps of data throughput depending on the 
experiment. 
The authors’ experimental design tested the 
implementation of RF-IP technology over various wired and 
wireless networks.  Each experiment built upon the success 
and failures of the previous.  The experiment in (Aug 06) 
mainly served as a familiarization with mesh technologies 
and IEEE 802.16 equipment.  The second experiment was 
designed to test the scope of this thesis and determine if 
and how bridging legacy radio equipment into IP networks 
could be implemented.  The third experiment expanded the
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authors knowledge base of the capabilities and limitations 
of the equipment used.  The forth and final experiments 
were used to gather metrics and quantitative data. 
B. TACTICAL NETWORK TOPOLOGY FIELD EXPERIMENT (AUG 06) 
The purpose of this experiment was to demonstrate how 
wireless mesh enabled devices used by a DO Platoon could be 
used within a larger network architecture.  Below is a 
brief explanation of the equipment used and summary of the 
results. 
 1. IEEE 802.16 
 Figure 21.   Redline TM AN-50e (From: [8]) 
 
The authors had access to leading technologies in the 
areas of IEEE 802.16.  One of the major technologies used 
was Redline Communications AN-50e equipment.  Redline is 
not the sole vendor of IEEE 802.16 technology.  They are 
one of many IEEE 802.16 vendors in the market place.  
However, the Marine Corps has chosen to procure Redline 
equipment.  The TNT experiments rely heavily on this 
equipment to carry high capacity data within the Camp 
Roberts tactical intranet as well as to link NPS to Camp 
Roberts.  System characteristics as follows: 
 The AN-50e is a high speed wireless Ethernet 
bridge that can be configured for point-to-point 
(PTP) or point to multipoint (PMP) operation.  
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 The system delivers an over the air rate of up to 
72 Mbps, equivalent to 49 Mbps at the Ethernet 
level.  
 Operates in the license exempt 5.470 - 5.725 GHz 
and 5.725 - 5.850 GHz bands.  
 In PTP mode the AN-50e adjusts for quality 
degradation by incrementally switching between 
modulation schemes from BPSK to 64 QAM.20  
The authors believe the Redline equipment has many 
positive attributes, the overall ones is its ability to 
carry larger amounts of data over long distances and easy 
of configuration.  This is evident regarding one of the 
five links to Camp Roberts is over 60km in length. 
2. Wireless, Ad-hoc Networking  
Although mesh networks are not the main scope of this 
thesis, they potentially may be an integral part of the 
future DO network architecture. For this reason, an 
examination of how current legacy systems could be used in 
conjunction emerging technologies is important to study.   
Mesh networks are defined as, “for n nodes in a 
network, the ability of each node to forward information 
for every other node in the network represents a mesh 
network topology.”21 For the purposes of DO, a node may be a 
communications device node used by each platoon member.  It 
could also refer to vehicles equipped with this type of 
equipment. Additional nodes could be part of the larger 
network architecture itself.  For example, traditional 
                     20 Redline Communications. Internet: 
http://www.redlinecommunications.com/products/AN50e.html, [November 16, 
2006]. 
21 Gilbert Held. Wireless Mesh Networks. Boca Raton, Florida: 
Auerbach Publications, 2005, p. 2.  
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communication towers, aerostat balloons or UAVs could 
incorporate mesh nodes. Listed below are some other key 
attributes of mesh networks: 
 Mesh networks are either connected via point to 
point (PtP) or point to multipoint (PtMp) 
 Every node acts as a radio transmitter and receiver 
 Every nodes acts as a forwarding agent 
 Every node can enter and leave the network with out 
disruption to the network 
 Each node has an unique identifier, generally the 
Media Access Control (MAC) or IP address 
 Nodes may either mobile or static 
For the purposes of experimentation the authors used 
Inter-4TM Corporation’s rugged tactical PDA’s (See Figure 
22) configured with wireless ITTTM Mesh cards. These 
embedded ITTTM mesh cards provided an Inter-4 software based 
encryption. PDA’s equipped with these network adapters are 
capable of providing its users real-time video, voice, SA 
and chat services within the Mesh architecture.  These 
services could be very useful in a DO environment. 
The TacticompsTM were configured at a frequency shifted 
2.4 GHz band and employed both Windows CETM and Windows XPTM 
operating systems.  The system utilize proprietary software 
developed by General Dynamics Corporation called Soldier 
Tactical SoftwareTM (STS).  These COTS devices are currently 
being used by some military units operating in Afghanistan 
and Iraq.  INTER-4TM was interested in product feedback and 





Figure 22.   Tacticomp Mesh devices. (From: [7]) 
 
 
 Figure 23.   Inter-4 Corp. Tacticomp Bridges and Network 
Extension Nodes. (From: [7]) 
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The experiment scenarios focused on platoon level and 
below operations.  Each experiment ran consecutively.  In 
scenario one (See Diagram 1) the authors where able to 
demonstrate encrypted mesh communications over Line of 
Sight (LOS) and NON-LOS conditions using a Mobile Mesh 
Router (MMR) (Figure 23) to bridge the gap.  Without the 
MMR, communications would not have been possible. Strategic 
placement of network nodes proved important to ensure 
stable communications.  
In scenario one (Diagram 1), Squads 1 and 2, are 
separated by a hill and have no LOS with the TOC.  Squad 3 
moved approximately 1-1.5Km from Squad 1 and almost 3.5 Km 
from the TOC. Squad 3 became the focal point in order to 
push the link.  Squad 3 was able to move through Non-LOS 
terrain with the MMR and still maintain voice and video 
with Squad 2 and the TOC.  All communications were 
successful up to approximately 3.5Km from the TOC.  The TOC 
was able to see video almost unimpeded while Squad 3 moved.   
 
 
Diagram 1.   Scenario 1 Mesh Only. 
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Each device provided real-time video, chat, 
situational awareness and voice communications.  All 
applications ran concurrently on each device.  At times 
this proved too much for the operating system on the T-1.5 
(Figure 22) which uses a 400 MHz processor.  Running one or 
two applications appeared to be optimal.   
The Inter-4 devices are tough to manipulate in terms 
of simple tasks.  The STS software is very robust.  In many 
cases there are two or three ways to accomplish simple 
tasks.  The software should be simplified so that basic 
tasks are more intuitive.    
The terrain at Camp Roberts proved challenging for the 
equipment and demonstrated significant problems when LOS 
was lost with another network node.  Deep draws or ravines 
would cause signal loss.  The use of the MMR (Figure 23) 
helped create a larger network cloud to facilitate better 
communications.  In real world applications there ideally 
would be several network nodes in any given area thus 
creating a network cloud. 
The scenario depicted in Diagram 2 proved very 
successful.  Efforts were directed to bridge the wireless 
encrypted mesh equipment over terrestrial equipment.  The 
ability to bridge this system over the Redline IEEE 802.16 
equipment demonstrated interoperability.  Efforts to pass 
real-time video across the mesh and over the IEEE 802.16 
were successful.  
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Diagram 2.   Scenario 2 Mesh/IEEE IEEE 802.16 Integration 
 
Squad 1 maintained LOS with the Inter-4 VAP (Versatile 
Access Point) located at the Light Reconnaissance Vehicle 
(LRV) and had virtually no problems with connectivity.  
Squads 2 and 3 pushed to earlier positions and had two main 
nodes in which to connect.  The MMR and the LRV (located 1 
km from each other on high points) provided the mesh points 
from which they would connect. 
Squads 2 and 3 moved north approximately 4 to 6 km 
respectfully from the TOC.  The LRV acted as the bridge 
from the mesh network into the broader IEEE 802.16 network.  
Video was successfully streamed from the LRV to the TOC 
over the IEEE 802.16 link and subsequently to Monterey.  
Additionally, video was streamed between Squads 2 and 3 




3. Near-Space Balloon  
The authors had the opportunity to use another 
transmission media that could prove useful for a DO unit.  
Space Data Corporation Inc. was conducting research at Camp 
Roberts testing their Starfighter payload.  This payload 
was used as an aerial relay for voice communications.  The 
company specializes in launching a network of high-altitude 
network balloons.  These balloons are typically launched 
every 8 to 12 hours to provide overlapping ground coverage.  
During the experiment these balloons achieved an altitude 
of 86,000ft and provided a coverage radius of over 400 
miles. 
 
Diagram 3.   SDC Near Space Balloon 86,000ft 
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While working with the Inter-4 mesh equipment the 
authors used the balloon payload as coordination net.  The 
company provided two (one uplink/one downlink) frequencies22 
which provided for continuously uninterrupted 
communications through out the experiment.  The signal was 
re-modulated, there by cleaning up the signal and improving 
its link quality.  
The promise of this technology affords a DO unit the 
ability to communicate with many of the same 
characteristics satellite communications have.  The main 
difference is time of flight. Balloons, like LEO 
satellites, must overlap to provide continuous coverage. 
Weather is generally not a problem since the balloons 
operate above the major weather patterns of the atmosphere.  
Winds do need careful examination for recovery purposes.  
During the entire flight the balloon is tracked via ground 
station. Recovery of the payload is a serious 
consideration. SDC stated they had a 90% recovery success 
of their payloads.  
Currently the company is working with the U.S. Air 
Force Space Command & Missile Systems Center Test Wing 
located at Kirtland Air Force Base. Many of their tests 
show the ability to extend traditional RF communications 
from 10 to 400 miles using their payload.23 
                     22 The frequencies provided where in the 300MHz range.  It is the 
authors understanding the payload acted as a “bent-pipe” rather than 
reprocessing the signal. 
23 Space Data Corporation. Internet: Press Release, August 30, 2006 
http://www.spacedata.net/press083006.htm ,[December 13, 2006]. 
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4. Conclusions 
The use of wireless mesh equipment for DO does have 
great potential.  Platoon level and below tests 
demonstrated shared situational awareness, real-time video 
and chat capabilities which under the current DO 
architecture is limited in scope.  Additionally it was 
demonstrated that encrypted wireless mesh network could be 
bridged across terrestrial IEEE 802.16 networks.  This 
holds great potential for high bandwidth communications in 
support of distributed forces. 
The authors believe the VoIP feature of the Tacticomps 
for short distances can be useful and may relieve a DO 
platoon of the need to carry a PRR for intra squad 
communications.  The mesh network could facilitate this and 
provide more robust performance using other applications 
such as chat and video. The form factors of Tacticomps, 
however, are undesirable. Though lightweight, the 
Tacticomps are bulky and require the user to hold the 
device like a palm pilot. It is also unlikely that Marines 
would use hill tops as patrol routes rather using the 
military crests and slopes.  This is a negative factor for 
mesh, where LOS is vital for network performance.  The 
experiment did not go into an urban environment therefore 
the stress of the network was not really tested.  VHF voice 
communications would and did work better in NLOS 
conditions; therefore network reliability of mesh is an 
issue. 
The mesh equipment did provide the squads much more 
capability than they would otherwise have. The obvious 
answer for many of these NLOS issues is providing a node in 
the sky or some sort of unmanned platform.  These 
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capabilities were not explored but should be in order to 
see the full potential of such architectures.  
In the end, the experiment did provide some great 
potential for routable mesh architectures.  It also 
demonstrated how a tactical network could be easily 
integrated into the larger IEEE 802.16 network backbone 
where anyone on the network with the right software could 
easily see and talk to a DO platoon in the mesh network 
The use of near-space balloons may provide the 
footprint needed for DO.  The ability to have a 400 mile 
swath of ground coverage would solve many of the LOS 
problems associated with DO.  Balloons could be launched 
and recovered from the sea where probability of payload 
loss would be diminished greatly since the likely hood of 
littoral regions would be secured by U.S. forces. 
Both examples demonstrate possible solutions for DO.  
The robustness of wireless mesh using near space balloons 
as network nodes could be one answer.  In either case, the 
use of these networks could facilitate the transport of 
networked voice communications.  Once the network is 
established, the bridging RF legacy equipment into the 
architecture could be accomplished.  The authors believe 
further research should be pursued in both of these areas 
to determine whether these technologies can be leveraged 
for distributed operations. 
C. TACTICAL NETWORK TOPOLOGY FIELD EXPIREMENT (OCT 06)   
The goal of these experiments was to demonstrate 
utilization of legacy RF radio systems bridging into 
existing networks.  The tactical integration of legacy 
radio equipment into long-haul IP links and tactical mesh 
networks look to provide better integration of existing 
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Marine Corp network protocols.  This experiment focused on 
the integration of the same ground radios used by DO and 
other Marine forces.  
1. Background:   
Distributed Operations (DO) is an evolving concept 
that seeks to maximize the Marine Air-Ground Task Force 
(MAGTF) commander’s ability to employ tactical units across 
the nonlinear battlespace.  Currently, the DO platoon is 
being equipped with extra HF/VHF/UHF radios and limited 
Iridium-based communication assets to address the tactical 
communication requirements of the distributed force.   
This research focused on the bridging of legacy 
equipment that is currently supplied to USMC DO platoons 
and interfacing with an ever growing tactical LAN 
architecture.  As data is being pushed to the last tactical 
mile24 and Marine Corps infantry battalions now are equipped 
with tactical network capabilities. The authors contend 
research demonstrating the practical bridge of legacy 
equipment into tactical IP infrastructures could better 
facilitate Distributed Operations.  Key leaders (Squad 
Leaders and Fire Team Leaders) are already equipped with 
PRC 148s, PRC 117Fs and PRC 119F radios to support 
communications.  Therefore research efforts should include 
networking current legacy radio equipment.    
This research focused on allowing Battalion Commanders 
and staffs the ability to use the tactical IP 
infrastructure currently in place to facilitate voice 
communications to their DO units who may be well beyond 
                     24 “last tactical mile” refers to military units who have never 
before had access to data links normally afforded to upper echelon 
units.  In this case infantry company and below are the last tactical 
mile.  
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traditional RF ranges.  This experiment demonstrated that 
as long as a DO unit has an interface with the network then 
anyone on that network can use their IP-based device to 
interface with legacy RF equipment. 
2. SPEED Analysis   
Speed (Systems Planning, Engineering, and Evaluation 
Device) is a communications planning software tool 
developed by Northrop Grumman Corporation.  SPEED is a 
fully integrated system for generating, storing, and 
disseminating communications information. SPEED provides 
rapid communications planning and support and was used for 
the link analysis for this experiment.   
In all of the experiments SPEED version 10.0.1 was 
used to test the viability of the communications links 
before actually deploying into a field environment at Camp 
Roberts.  SPEED accounts for equipment parameters and 
terrain characteristics among other variables that affect 
communications.  The software allows for easy analysis to 
determine if a link is viable. Adjustments can be made to 
determine the right location of antennas and placement of 
the equipment used. 
a. SPEED Analysis – IEEE 802.16 Redline 
Equipment 
Experiment 1 demonstrated the viability of the 
link between terrestrial radio equipment.  In this case,  
IEEE 802.16 Redline AN-50e equipment was used for LOS 
analysis.  Equipment and link parameters are detailed in 
the Figures below.  Each figure provides details on radio 
settings and specific parameters of the equipment.  A solid 
line indicates an acceptable link.  A dotted line indicates 
an unacceptable link.  
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The authors attempted to closely match the radio 
and network settings used by the TNT experiments.  Speed 
accounts for terrain elevation and specific characteristics 
of the radios.  It is the opinion of the authors that this 
analysis provided a fairly accurate assessment of the 
feasibility of each radio link before the actual 
experiments began. 
Figures 24 and 25 demonstrate LOS communications 
between the TOC located at McMillan Airfield and 
Nacimeiento Hill to the west.  LOS communications with a 
distant node 10 kilometers to the north are also achieved. 
 
 




 Figure 25.   Redline AN-50 Radio Settings 
 
Figure 26 depicts a LOS link from Nacimeiento 
Hill to a distant node in the field.  For purposes of the 
experiment, the authors investigated how a DO platoon 
(distant node) would link into the network when there was 
not LOS directly with the next higher echelon unit.  It is 
not important to have this link collocated with friendly 
forces but merely within the RF sphere.  By extending the 
network link, the RF-to-IP connection can be anywhere the 





Figure 26.   Point-to-Point Analysis from Nacimeiento 
Hill to Distant Node. 
 
b. SPEED Analysis – VHF Equipment 
Legacy radio equipment performs poorly for long 
range communications.  The dotted red lines depicted on 
Figure 27 depict the inability of VHF communications to 
supply coverage at ranges only 8-10 kilometers from the 
TOC.  However, much depends on the terrain, power and type 
of antenna used.  In the analysis the authors attempted to 
match the approximate power settings typically used by 


















Figure 27.   Unacceptable Link from TOC to DO Plt. 
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 Figure 28.   Radio Settings for PRC 117f used by DO Plt. 
 
Unacceptable links are caused mainly from terrain 
as shown in Figures 27 and 28.  The graph inside the figure 
indicates several hills between the TOC and the distant 
nodes.  Even though VHF can propagate well in rolling 
terrain, it does not perform well in this scenario.  
This analysis provided insight into possible 
communication difficulties a DO unit may face working 
merely with VHF radios. The use of RF-to-IP communications 
greatly extends the network architecture to the forward 









Figure 29.   VHF Coverage Pattern for PRC 117F at the TOC 
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 Figure 30.   VHF Coverage between TOC and DO Plt. 
 
 
c. Speed Analysis – MESH 
Speed does not have operating characteristics for 
ITT Mesh cards in its database.  Therefore, the authors 
substituted SECNET-11 cards in the SPEED database as a 
substitute.  They possess the relative frequency range and 
power used for field study.  Figure 31 illustrates the 
possible PtP link between ITT Mesh nodes in the field.  
Only the ITT MESH balloon node maintains connectivity with 
the other nodes. This is depicted by the solid lines of 
from the balloon vice the dotted lines of the other nodes 
in Figure 31. For analysis purposes the balloon’s altitude 
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is 3500 feet.  Figures 32 & 33 demonstrate the coverage 
pattern with and without the use of the balloon.  Shaded 
areas depict existing RF coverage. Due to its altitude, the 
balloon greatly enhanced network coverage. Figure 32 
demonstrates coverage without the balloon to be 
unacceptable.  Figure 33 demonstrates the LOS coverage 
pattern out to 8 kilometers. The use of multiple high 
altitude nodes would significantly increase the coverage 
radius of those nodes within its footprint. 
 















Figure 33.   ITT MESH With the Balloon Node 
 
d. Conclusions 
The SPEED analysis provided a solid baseline from 
which to conduct field study.  Examining the feasibility of 
the various equipment used in the experiment allowed the 
authors to make more accurate assumptions.  Signal 
propagation under specified equipment parameters gave a 
practical assessment of various terrestrial radio equipment 
would perform at Camp Roberts.  Additionally, examining the 
coverage patterns of legacy VHF radios and ITT MESH cards 
helped show the effects of terrain.  In each analysis SPEED 
allow the testing of equipment settings without field 
study.  The authors believe this type of analysis helps 
take much of the guess work out of the research and 
enforces or negates assumptions by the authors. 
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3. Experiment Assumptions 
 The DO unit (Company or Platoon) are equipped 
with the proposed field communication assets dictated by 
the Marine Corp Warfighting Lab (MCWL).  All units are 
using Type 1 encryption. 
 The DO Platoon is within normal RF ranges (< 5 Km 
for manpack and < 15 Km for vehicular) of a long haul link.  
In this case IEEE 802.16.  Diagram 4 illustrates basic 
setup. 
 Long-haul links are tied into larger IP network 
infrastructures.  For the purposes of this experiment the 
TNT architecture is used.  Diagram 4 demonstrates an IEEE 
802.16 link only.  For practical purposes the medium could 
be any Layer 2 or 3 technology providing access into a 
tactical internet infrastructure.  




4. Equipment Technology Used  
a. Radio Hardware 
• (3) Harris PRC 117F VHF/UHF Radio 
• 1 AC to DC power supply 
• 1 Speaker box with H250 Handset 
• (1) Harris PRC 152 (VHF) Hand Held Radio 
2 rechargeable batteries w/charger 
• (4) PRC 119F VHF Radios - SL3 Complete 
• (4) PRC 148 Radios (MBITR) - SL3 Complete and 
two BB390 rechargeable batteries each 
• (1) SkyPilot System 
• (4) Panasonic Tough books 
• (6) ITT Mesh Cards 
• (3) Raytheon NXU2 (RF to IP converters) 
 
b. NXU2-ATM 
There are numerous hardware and software 
applications for converting the serial data from tactical 
radios into an Ethernet frames. Among the most common are 
E/M (Ear/Mouth) cards used in routers. These cards take the 
four-wire signaling from the radio, along with the push-to-
talk ground closure and convert them to IP packets. We 
chose the Raytheon NXU2-A for our radio to IP interface. 
This interface is modularized, small, easily configured, 
and easily updated with test settings. The NXU2-A is also 
cheaper than a router populated with the needed E/M cards. 
The NXU2-A is a fairly new device on the market compared to 
the router cards and is also newly added in the software 




Figure 34.   NXU2-A   
 
The NXU2-A is configured via a serial interface 
cable or a remote web interface. Once connected to the 
configuration page of the NXU2-A, numerous configuration 
operations are available. The options provide for easy 
configuration of various radio applications. The ability to 
change VOX levels, IP addresses, voice encoders, and 
connection modes to name a few. 
c. Sky Pilot System TM 
The Sky Pilot System was another transmission 
media used in support of our experiments. Sky Pilot uses 
the IEEE 802.11A wireless protocol with directed antennas 
providing extensive ranges. The authors were given a 
SkyConnector to use to connect into the experiment IEEE 
802.16 network.  The SkyConnector provides an Ethernet drop 
to the subscriber and connects to the high-capacity 
wireless mesh network through a directional 5 GHz link. The 
connector is capable of ranges up to 7.5 miles/12 km NLOS. 
The networking capabilities of the Sky Pilot network also 
facilitate the ease of seamlessly adding and removing nodes 
within the network. The system operates in the 4.9 to 5.8 
GHz range of spectrum and consists of several different 




Figure 35.   Sky Pilot System (From: [30]) 
 
d. Twisted Pair WAVETM Software 
Twisted Pair WAVE MEDIA SERVERTM (SP3 Beta 
Version) is a gateway computer designated to mix audio 
channels for the WAVE application. The media server 
software also provides the tones required for IP phones to 
key certain radios. The media server software provides 
mixing of audio signals from different users into WAVE 
“sessions”. These sessions determine what WAVE “channels” 
are provided to individual users on VOIP devices. These 
VoIP devices include computers running WAVE’S Desktop 
Communicator, configured IP telephones, Plain Old Telephone 
(POTS) devices, cell phones, and more. The media server 
hardware is determined by the number of users. Since there 
were never more than 25 users during our experimentation, 
we were able to run the WAVE media server software on the 
WAVE Management Server.  
Twisted Pair WAVE CONFIGURATION MANAGERTM contains 
all of the configuration data for participants in WAVE 
sessions. A central administrator will create user accounts 
with numerous options for access. Access includes 
monitoring only, transmit capability, and access to 
different sessions. The Management Server Administrator 
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configures channels for audio participants on the network. 
A session is then configured which allows users access to 
different channels. A session may provide a user with a 
number of different channels to include radio networks, 
audio streams, phone conferences, and paging channels.  
Twisted Pair WAVE DESKTOP COMMUNICATORTM is a PC 
application which allows users to access channels and can 
be loaded by logging onto the web page for the Management 
Server. From this web page the Desktop Communicator 
software is downloaded over the network onto the users’ PC. 
The Desktop Communicator logs onto the Wave Management 
Server and opens the channels that are available to that 
user. Depending on the access granted by the administrator, 
the user can transmit on a channel, text message other 
users that are online, monitor audio on individual 
channels, mute channels, and more.  
The Desktop Communicator gives the option of 
logging in via a unicast connection. The unicast function 
is helpful when the user is logging in from a remote 
location which does not support multicasts, such as over 
the internet or through a Virtual Private Network (VPN). 
Unicast was used exclusively during our experiment as 
multicast was not enabled on all switches and routers in 
the experimental deployed networks. Multicast was not an 
option while using the MESH networks for relaying voice 
traffic as well.  
5. Field Experiments and Demonstration Technologies 
Legacy radio equipment was examined for RF over IP 
integration.  The authors used the established long-haul 
IEEE 802.16 connection from Camp Roberts to NPS, to 
demonstrate military VHF voice integration over an IP 
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network infrastructure.  This experiment investigated voice 
quality over a 100 mile link using legacy radio equipment 
over the IEEE 802.16 waveform.  Further attempts to mimic 
the actual mobility of DO units on each distant end and 
allow those units to communicate at extended ranges were 
investigated.   
The actual experiments simulate a DO Platoon (Diagram 
5)conducting distributed operations in the vicinity of 
McMillan airfield in order to locate and defeat enemy 
forces and destroy encampments in the AO to prevent the 
spread of insurgent forces. The IEEE 802.16 link depicted 
in Diagram 5 is specific to this experiment but could 
represent any link providing access into a tactical 
internet infrastructure. The intent here is to establish 
RF-to-IP integration using the WAVE software and NXU2s. 
 
Diagram 5.   DO Exp 1 - Legacy VHF voice over IEEE 802.16 
network 
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a. Test Results  
The WAVE server was installed in the Tactical 
Operations Center (TOC) at Camp Roberts. One AN/PRC-117F 
was connected to a NXU2 at the TOC. This central node was 
connected to mobile users via a Very High Frequency (VHF) 
covering up to 6 kilometers of hilly terrain with minimal 
vegetation. The network was connected back to the Naval 
Post Graduate School (NPS) via a Redline IEEE 802.16 
backbone.  
A user staged at NPS was using Desktop 
Communicator to monitor and coordinate traffic on the 
network. The NPS user was able to successfully communicate 
with the handheld radio operator that was mobile on Camp 
Roberts. The mobile radio operator was also able to 
communicate back to the NPS user over the IEEE 802.16 
network. There were no latency, or jitter problems 
encountered and voice quality and availability was 
excellent.  
 




Figure 36 shows the NPS user talking over desktop 
communicator to a user at the TOC on Camp Roberts. The 
connection was via a Redline IEEE 802.16 link. Distance for 
this connection was over 100 miles. Distance from the TOC 
to radio users was over an average of 6 kilometers. 
Experiment two investigated a shorter PtP link 
incorporating the SkyPilot IEEE 802.11A technology into the 
network.  The authors used the services of WINTEC 
Corporation to provide LOS communications to the broader 
IEEE 802.16 network used by TNT.  Once this link was 
established, RF to IP voice was transferred back and forth 
from DO platoon to the TOC via the IEEE 802.11A network.  
The mobile ground unit passed voice traffic thru this link 
to the TOC and also the network lab located at NPS.  (See 
Diagram 6)   
 
Diagram 6.   DO Experiment 2.  LRV IEEE 802.11A 
Integration 
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The LRV established an IEEE 802.11A link with CR 
TOC via Naciamento Hill and used a PRC-119F to communicate 
with the DO Platoons.  The LRV used a laptop and WAVE 
desktop communicator to talk to the DO platoons and used a 
PRC 117F to communicate to platoons for redundancy.  Co HQ 
(CR TOC) communicated via IEEE 802.11A to the LRV and then 
IP to RF to the DO platoons. 
 
Figure 37.   IEEE 802.11A Sky Pilot System Into IEEE 
802.16 Network 
 
Figure 38.   Desktop Communicator & NXU2 
 
This test demonstrated the use of the Sky Pilot 
system to provide long haul over the horizon connectivity 
to the NXU2-A. A mobile radio operator displaced a Sky 
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Pilot extender beyond the Radio Frequency (RF) range of the 
TOC. From this location the operator was unable to 
communicate with an AN/PRC-119F on a VHF frequency to the 
TOC. The operator connected the AN/PRC119F to the NXU2-A 
and connected the Ethernet output of the NXU2-A into the 
handheld Extender. The extender connected via IEEE 802.11A 
to a Sky Pilot network of Gateways connected to the TOC. 
The radio operator was then able to drive around with 
another AN/PRC-119F and talk on a VHF frequency. The radio 
operator was able to get an average of 6 kilometers of 
distance from the Sky Pilot extender before using VHF RF 
coverage. This enabled the operator to talk at a distance 
of over 12 kilometers on a 4 watt VHF transceiver to the 
TOC. The operator was also able to talk to the NPS operator 
over 100 miles away via the combination of the VHF, Sky 
Pilot, and IEEE 802.16 network. The TOC and NPS operator 
were also able to effectively transmit over the respective 
networks to the radio operator in the field.  
Experiment three added different end systems in 
to the network such as IP phones and laptops. This 
demonstrated how a user could manipulate different IP based 
devices (See Diagram 7) to communicate using a PRC 119F (or 
similar legacy radio) in the field.  Or if configured 
properly, use multiple devices from separate physical 
locations on the network, to communicate as required.  This 
investigated the ability to give more individuals greater 
situational awareness of the battlespace and further tied 




Diagram 7.   Experiment 3 Additional Node Integration 
 
The Cisco IP phone was configured to operate on 
the Cisco Call Manager installed in the TOC. The WAVE 
Server was configured to give access to all tested radio 
channels on the IP phone. Once logged in via the IP phone, 
users in the TOC were able to successfully monitor radio 
traffic and transmit on the VHF radio network to the radio 
operator in the field. The IP phone was successful with the 
IEEE 802.16, Sky Pilot, and ITT Mesh connections. Operators 
in the TOC were also able to communicate via an IP phone 
with the NPS operator using Desktop Communicator over the 
IEEE 802.16 network.  
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 Figure 39.   IP Phone to Radio Integration 
 
Experiment four demonstrated integration of 
legacy military VHF/UHF radios into a mesh architecture and 
demonstrated the capability to pass voice traffic over a 
separate private network with the broader network using ITT 
Mesh as a backhaul instead of IEEE 802.16.  This 
investigated using other waveforms to link radios into 
disparate networks within a larger network.  The use of 
tethered balloons and UAVs were used to demonstrate a 
wireless network.  RF converted into IP in this environment 
could bridge existing technologies with emerging mesh 
routing protocols to greatly expand communications. 
This test demonstrated the successful integration of a 
mesh network for relaying voice traffic from a tactical 
radio. Desktop communicator was also successfully employed 
in a moving vehicle connected to a mesh network. A mesh 




Figure 40.   Balloon & MMR Mesh Node 
 
A subscriber device was also added to a small Unmanned 
Aerial Vehicle (UAV). Other mesh devices in the mesh 
network included Inter-4 T-1.5 devices and the Inter-4 
Mobile Mesh Router (MMR). The mesh network covered an area 
of approximately six square kilometers of Camp Roberts. 
  
Figure 41.   NPS Rascal UAV with Mesh Node 
 
As with the previous experiments, a tactical 
radio was displaced beyond RF range of the TOC. From here, 
the tactical radio was connected to the NXU-2A and the 
Ethernet output of the NXU2-A was connected to another 
laptop. This laptop was configured as a join point with an 
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ITT mesh PCMCIA card connected to the mesh network. This 
configuration provided connectivity from the tactical radio 
network across the six kilometers of mesh enabled terrain 
to the TOC. A mobile radio operator was able to 
successfully communicate from a handheld VHF radio to the 
TOC and NPS operators. While connectivity over the mesh 
network was spotty at times, voice quality was excellent 
when the IP network was stable.  
 
 
Figure 42.   Author Communicating RF-to-IP via ITT Mesh 
 
The join point laptop was loaded with the WAVE 
Desktop Communicator allowing an operator to use the 
Desktop Communicator to talk with personnel in the TOC and 
at NPS. This operator was also able to talk to the mobile 
radio operator using a hand held VHF radio. Voice quality 
was excellent and availability was dependent on the 
stability of the mesh environment.   
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b. Overall Experiment Conclusions  
The result of these experiments demonstrated a 
unique capability not currently employed by the Marine 
Corps.  The ability to network tactical radios into an IP 
network may provide a way for a DO platoon to communicate 
to multiple entities as required by their mission.  Key 
milestones from these experiments were:    
 Tactical Radios to  multiple laptop communication 
 Tactical Radios to CISCO-IP phone communication 
 Tactical Radio to wireless device i.e. Palm Pilot 
 Bridging different radio frequencies in order for 
separate radios to communicate via the network 
 Ability to have multiply frequencies broadcast 
over one radio net 
 Ability to bridge commercial radios to tactical 
radios via network 
 Ability to use multicast and unicast 
communications 
 Ability to network tactical radios across IEEE 
802.16, IEEE 802.11A and Mesh network 
These experiments demonstrate simple yet 
achievable changes to the current network architecture to 
help DO units communicate more effectively. 
D. TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
1. Security  
Encryption of voice traffic is critically important in 
any mission oriented circuit. Encryption of voice traffic 
was handled in two ways during these experiments. All voice 
traffic is encrypted from radio to radio within the radio 
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network. This means that the voice traffic is encrypted 
from entry into the network and remains encrypted, in one 
form or the other, until it is accessed by the user on the 
distant end. From the radio operators location, voice is 
encrypted with standard military Type I encryption using 
Vinson keymat. This encrypted voice traffic is relayed over 
the RF connection to the base station radio where it is de-
encrypted with the same keymat before being cabled to the 
NXU-2. The voice traffic is then changed to IP packets and 
sent over the IP network to the WAVE Server. This 
connection from the base station radio to the Wave Server 
is not encrypted and therefore problematic. There are three 
solutions to addressing this issue. 
 
Diagram 8.   Link Encryption Option One 
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Encryption option one (Diagram 8) requires the use of 
a line encryption device such as a KIV-7, OMNI-XI, or KG at 
the base station location. This line encryption device 
would be used to encrypt the traffic as it is transported 
over the long haul transmission media (IEEE 802.16, mesh, 
SATCOM, etc). Advantages include the assurance of a secure 
connection across the IP network. Disadvantages are the 
requirement for additional equipment and possible points of 
failure in the encryption devices. Also, IP phones and PDA 
clients could not be used in the option. 
Vinson link Encryption 2: 
---End to end Vinson encryption from radio to radio
---Base station radio is pass thru with no decryption or encryption
functions
---Computer, Voip Phone, and PDA clients cannot talk secure to 
radio users. 
 
Diagram 9.   End to End Audio Encryption Option Two 
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Encryption option two (Diagram 9) calls for the use of 
a pass-thru radio at the base station site. This radio does 
not de-encrypt the RF traffic it receives. It only sends 
encrypted RF audio traffic to the NXU for transport over 
the IP network. This solution does not require the use of a 
line encryption devices on the network since the voice is 
not decrypted until it reaches the distant end radio. The 
desktop, PDS, or IP phone clients will not work on the 
radio network for this configuration. 
Once the voice traffic reaches the WAVE server it is 
encrypted via software. The WAVE server provides up to 256 
AES encryption over the IP network to desktop communicator 
and IP phone endpoints. This encryption is not possible for 
POTS or cell phone users that access the voice network from 
the WAVE Server. Therefore, external encryption is required 
from the POTS or cell phone user by use of standard STE, 
STU, OMNI, etc. technology keyed to the same or encryption 
level as the radio network.  
Advantages of option two include not requiring 
additional hardware encryption devices. The audio is 
encrypted during the entire transport over the IP network. 
However, the IP phone and PDA clients cannot be used since 
they do not have the built in ability to decrypt the audio 
from a radio.  
 Option three eliminates these line encryption problems 
by placing the equipment onto the SIPRNET. This network is 
authorized for the secret level of security on the voice 
network. Advantages of this option are the use of as little 
additional equipment as possible. This option also allows 
for the use of IP phones and PDA clients. This is the 
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recommended implementation since it requires the least 
amount of hardware and provides the most in capability.  
SIPRNET  3:
---Use SIPRNET as the IP network
---Radio audio is decrypted at the radio site and transported in the clear 
across the IP network
---Radio traffic line encryption devices are not required
---Server to client IP connections are encrypted with 256 bit AES 
encryption across the SIPRNET
 
Diagram 10.   SIPRNET Encryption Option Three 
 
2. Bandwidth/Throughput Measurements  
The affect WAVE technology has on IP networks is 
important.  The authors decided to conduct measurements of 
bandwidth utilization in a lab setting rather than the 
field.  The purpose is to investigate the impact the 
technology has on an IP network.  The authors were limited 
in equipment and network devices, therefore only a few 
devices were enabled for measure and analysis.  The authors 
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believe the data obtained for measure is scalable for 
larger networks depending on the number of clients using 
the WAVE software. The numbers of radio networks bridged 
into the IP network are only limited by the number of NXU2s 
and radio nets.  
 
Figure 43.   Lab Test of Bandwidth/Throughput 
 
The authors used the Solar WindsTM network management 
tool to measure network performance.  In order for 
measurements to be obtained, network devices were SNMP 
enabled. “The Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) is 
an application layer protocol that facilitates the exchange 
of management information between network devices. It is 
part of the Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol 
(TCP/IP) protocol suite. SNMP enables network 
administrators to manage network performance, find and 
solve network problems, and plan for network growth.”25  
Solar Winds measurements were primarily done on the WAVE 
server and one client running WAVE Desktop Communicator.                       25 CISCO Corporation Website. 
91
One PRC-117F was configured to receive the maritime weather 
frequency.  The purpose of selecting this frequency is to 
provide the network constant and continuous radio 
communications over a continuous period.  A client running 
Desktop communicator was configured to receive the audio.  
Since the client was only receiving and not transmitting 
audio, the authors realize the data only represents receive 
traffic.  The intent was to show the impact of the 
technology on network load in general terms.  The size and 
scope of the IP network will greatly determine the actual 
effect of the technology as a whole.   
The SNMP function of the tested NXU2 was not enabled 
by the vendor; therefore bandwidth could not be measured 
directly. The NXU2 was configured for a 13Kbps codec which 
is the lowest setting allowed by the system.  Since all 
traffic must flow through the WAVE server, the 
bandwidth/throughput measurements were taken primarily from 
it and a client running on the network.   
Wave server and client measurements listed in Table 4 
reflect a snapshot of data recorded over a 24 hour period.  
The primary intent was to determine the effect the WAVE 
server and client applications had on the network.  
Bandwidth was scaled to 256Kbps and 1MBps.  Currently the 
Marine Corps has very limited bandwidth at the battalion 
level.  The authors believed 256Kbps was a conservative 
throughput baseline for this test.  The 1MBps figure 
reflects the amount of bandwidth that could be provided by 





Table 4.   Server & Client Bandwidth Measurements 
 
The table illustrates the effects of various codecs 
and the use of encryption on bandwidth.  There are multiple 
combinations of settings on the WAVE server and the authors 
chose the highest and lowest server codec.  Predictably an 
increase in codec or application of encryption increases 
the amount of bandwidth used.  Of note, the WAVE server has 
little impact on the overall bandwidth.   
The authors believe that any adoption of WAVE 
technology for DO should closely parallel increases in 
bandwidth capacity for the Marine Corps infantry battalions 
or those entities directly supporting DO units.  Adding RF 
voice communications on current data networks would only 
increase bandwidth needs and compete with other 
applications residing on the network.  Since the authors 
did not apply this test to an actual military network the 
exact impact is estimated. 
E. INTEGRATION OF RF-TO-IP TECHNOLOGY WITHIN THE MARINE 
CORPS 
1. Location of Wave Server within the Marine Corps  
 The Wave Server could support a MAGTF in various 
configurations. The largest configuration would be an 
enterprise implementation configured and operated at the 
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MEF level. The smallest implementation would be the use of 
the WAVE Management and Media Servers loaded on a single 
laptop supporting a Battalion COC. Implementation at the 
MEF level would take considerable configuration depending 
on the number of channels required and the number of users 
supported. The MEF implementation, while possible, is not 
recommended to support battalion level voice operations. By 
providing the server configuration and control at the 
Battalion level, faster coordination and troubleshooting 
are likely. Also, if the server is located at the MEF 
level, all radio traffic must traverse the entire IP 
network up to the MEF level in order to be processed and 
returned to the Battalion VOIP user. A multicast 
implementation would have much less of an impact on the 
network as opposed to numerous unicast connections. The 
Battalion level server administrator also has the ability 
to provide access to any higher command user if requested. 
Therefore, all assets within the MAGTF can have access to 
voice traffic as requested with the central configuration 
coming from the unit most connected with the radio networks 
in question.  
2. Management of Voice Network  
The management of the voice network becomes the 
responsibility of the unit controlling the server. Once the 
voice network is converged onto the IP network, various 
configurations, accesses levels, and permissions are 
possible for users. The server administrator can provide a 
monitor only account to users that will disable the ability 
to transmit on the radio network. This tool is useful when 
a section only requires situational awareness of a unit 
rather than the ability to provide command and control. 
Users can also be granted the ability to monitor or 
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transmit on IP telephones, POTS phones, or even cell 
phones. Certain security measures have to be in place on 
these type of accesses to ensure sensitive information 
being transmitted on a radio network is not relayed to a 
non-secure phone line. These measures are addressed 
elsewhere in this document. Traditional voice encryption 
techniques for phone systems can mitigate this risk and 
still provide the service to users. Users on a personal 
computer, such as those in a command center, can also be 
granted a channel for text chat and audio monitoring 
without the ability to transmit on the radio channel. This 
function provides the ability for users on the IP side of 
the network to collaborate via voice or text traffic 
instantly without having to use a separate phone line.  
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IV. DO COMMAND AND CONTROL CONSIDERATIONS 
A. EXTERNAL FACTORS 
The current Marine Corps communications architecture 
provides a proven yet limited networking capacity. For 
example, a Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) level command 
element (CE) is doctrinally provided with a Ground Mobile 
Forces (GMF) satellite connection of 1024 Kbps of 
networking bandwidth.26 This bandwidth is further extended 
to the Division, Marine Logistics Group (MLG), and Air 
Wing. Of this 1024 Kbps of aggregate bandwidth distributed 
from the MEF, it is further allocated into respective 
individual networks. A common allocation of this bandwidth 
includes NIPRNET (128 Kbps), SIPRNET (256 Kbps), VTC (386 
Kbps), and a Digital Trunk Group (128 Kbps).27  There are 
organic assets available to augment the networking 
bandwidth for the MEF to include using additional GMF 
terminals normally slated for use by subordinate units such 
as the Wing, FSSG, or Division. It is not uncommon to see a 
MEF augmented with an additional Defense Information 
Systems Network (DISN) satellite Standard Tactical Entry 
Point (STEP) satellite connection. With both satellite 
links, the MEF is still only supplied with roughly the 
equivalent of two T-1 lines worth of bandwidth for non-
intelligence based communications networking. 
                     26 TM 083447A/08348-10/1 GMF Satellite Communications System. 




Figure 44.   USMC Ground Mobile Forces SATCOM 
 
The recent development of converging technologies from 
a circuit switched network to an Internet Protocol (IP) 
based network presents many challenges to the Marine Corps 
limited available tactical bandwidth. While the 
proliferation of IP based communications provide for many 
new capabilities to include common user protocols, open 
systems architectures, common transmission media, and 
others, the cost to the user is the need for additional 
bandwidth. This bandwidth constraint will be relieved as 
the advent of Transformational Communications Satellite 
(TSAT), the Global Information Grid (GIG), and Joint 
Tactical Radio Systems (JTRS) begin to evolve and become 
fielded in the near future. Until then, intelligent and 
inventive use of the networks we have available is the way 
ahead to transformation.  
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The Distributed Operations Concept is an instance of 
an immediate need for the Marine Corps to begin a smart use 
of available networking bandwidth. As evidenced by recent 
evaluations of the Distributed Operations Concept, long 
range and extended operations translate into additional 
weight carried by the already belabored Marine. Rather than 
increase the equipment burden on these Marines, not to 
mention the additional non war-fighting skills required to 
operate such equipment, the Marine Corps has to find ways 
to pull these Marines into the network with minimal impact 
on the Marine and minimal impact on the bandwidth 
constrained network.  
As for the position of the DO platoon in this 
hierarchy of networking bandwidth, they are further 
handicapped. The DO platoon is the most bandwidth 
constrained of all, with access to bandwidth available only 
through organic tactical radios and Iridium based handsets. 
The highest useable bandwidth for data transfers is an 
average of 40 Kbps. If this bandwidth is not constrained 
enough, this 40 Kbps is on the bottom tier of the network. 
So, if a DO platoon had the requirement to send data 
outside of the MEF’s immediate area of operation (AO), it 
would have to contend with the connectivity, availability, 
robustness, and capacity of all layers between their 
location and the MEF satellite connection. Their 
alternative is the Ultra High Frequency (UHF) satellite 
connection from a man-portable AN/PRC-117 radio. While 
certainly capable 40 Kbps data transfer, the saturation of 
available UHF satellite channels would not realistically 
support the impending mission of the DO platoon without 
dedicated assignment of UHF satellite access. 
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1.  Bandwidth Limitations Considerations 
The limited bandwidth available to the MEF is further 
constrained for subordinate users. Traditionally, the MEF 
extends its networks to Major Subordinate Commands (MSC) 
via point-to-point GMF satellite links from an AN/TSC-93 or 
tactical microwave connections from the AN/TRC-170. The 
AN/TSC-93 provides a connection to the MEF up to a rate of 
2048 Kbps.28 The AN/TRC-170 provides this connection 
terrestrially at rates up to 4098 Kbps. Any connections 
below the MSC level will be connected to the network via 
the smaller terrestrial microwave terminal known as the 
AN/MRC-142. The AN/MRC-142 provides data rates up to 576 
Kbps.29 Important to note is the fact that all of these 
subordinate connections are sharing the MEF’s one to two T-
1 equivalent connections out to the GIG.  
2.  Possible Solutions  
Possible solutions for mitigating this communications 
deficit include the use of a “disassociated processing of 
command and control”, or the inclusion of additional 
networking equipment. Both have costs associated with them 
that must be considered in lieu of the mission. The basic 
hurdles of communications are tied to our current knowledge 
of physics and technology. These limits identify themselves 
in the current equipment and technologies available for 
fielding. Among others, these hurdles of physics 
materialize into communications link budgets for increasing 
power, bandwidth, and antenna size for communications 
transmission equipment. The technological limitations of 
commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) equipment is promising yet 
limited in its capabilities. Understanding these 
                     28 CJCSM 6231.04 Joint Transmission Systems. 
29 TM 09543A-12: AN/MRC-142 Radio Terminal Set.  
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limitations for the effective employment of command and 
control at the tactical level is critical in providing a 
realistic and immediately attainable solution. 
a. Option 1 
This option is demonstrated by processing of 
information at an intermediate headquarters level. This 
level could be the Landing Force Operations Center (LFOC), 
MEF Command Element, Division Command Post, or Company 
Command Post. The level of command and control (C2) is 
mission dependent and not critical for this C2 analysis. 
The critical piece to the disassociated processing is the 
location of the manpower intensive data processing and 
intelligence analysis. The key for support is on the 
efforts of higher headquarters supporting the DO Marine 
element. The information is processed and staffed at the 
headquarters level and passed on to the DO Marine via the 
IP enabled voice network. All intelligence gathering, fire 
support processing, data processing, logistics coordination 
and more are done at a higher headquarters element. The 
required communications bandwidth, equipment, batteries, 
training, etc. needed to conduct these missions would no 
longer be required of the DO platoon. The enabling factor 
allowing this concept lies in the networking of the organic 
voice assets to which the DO Marines are already well 
versed. In lieu of the critical bandwidth deficiencies 
faced by the DO Marine, voice communications would be used 
to connect the DO Marine to his requirements. As 
intelligence, logistics, fire support, and information 
become available to higher headquarters, it is processed 
and relayed to the DO Marine over the IP enabled voice 
network.  
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The equipment costs associated with this option 
are lowest of the two but the human costs are higher. The 
human costs would be associated with the additional 
manpower required to support the forward deployed DO Marine 
from the headquarters staff. Additional manpower would also 
be required to provide the enhanced voice communications 
relay supporting the additional distance of the DO platoon. 
A dedicated communications support element, commonly known 
as the radio retransmission team, would be required to 
close the additional distance for the communications link. 
This team could be as small as a two or three man element 
with specialized training on the proposed equipment 
composition. Their primary mission would be to locate an 
attractive communications relay point within the radio 
frequency (RF) range of the DO platoon. Once established, 
this team would provide an aggregated and networked relay 
of the High Frequency (HF), Very High Frequency (VHF), and 
Ultra High Frequency (UHF) communications from the DO 
platoon.  
b. Option 2 
This option requires the use of available COTS 
wireless equipment to be employed as a radio retransmission 
location in support of the DO platoon at their mission 
location. The proliferation of small, lightweight, high 
capacity, reliable, secure long-haul communications systems 
available on the market today, allow for a multitude of 
options for this long haul connection back to the higher 
headquarters. The proposed implementation also provides the 
ability to allow different frequency voice networks to 
interoperate. Voice traffic on one network, a UHF ground to 
air close air support mission for instance, would be 
transparently available to other VHF ground users as well 
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as any IP networked user in the chain of command. Users 
higher in the chain of command would also have the option 
of transmitting on the HF, VHF, or UHF voice networks of 
the DO platoon from applications running on laptops or IP 
phones in their command centers. 
Commanders at any level have the ability to 
monitor or control the DO force remotely. The enabling 
technology for this implementation uses currently available 
commercial grade software and hardware. The encrypted voice 
traffic from the DO platoon radios is converted to IP 
packets and sent over the network to a common server used 
for mixing and assigning access to the voice channels. The 
DO voice net can be accessed via IP phones, cell phone, 
POTS phones, Personal Digital Assistant (PDA), or a laptop 
computer from anywhere in the world to which the IP network 
extends. 
3. External Factor Analysis  
In conclusion, the limited bandwidth available to 
tactical units is hierarchical in nature and decreases the 
closer you get to the tactical edge. The one or two T-1 
equivalents of bandwidth provided by the MEF Command 
Element drastically limits the network services that can be 
provided to an infantry battalion that requires access to 
distant units over an IP infrastructure. While terrestrial 
solutions may provide sufficient sized connections to 
adjacent units, the joint environment operated in today 
often requires satellite connections to higher commands. 
These satellite connections are strictly limited in 
bandwidth and therefore all network services have to be 
limited in their usage of the precious resource. This paper 
illustrates the convergence of typical voice radio networks 
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onto the IP infrastructure. Once the voice network is 
accessible over all levels of command and control of the 
force, numerous options are available for supporting the 
most forward deployed Marine on the battlefield. Rather 
than burdening the Marine with additional equipment for 
supporting his C2 needs, the intelligence gathering, 
logistics control, and other requirements can be relegated 
to a higher command element on the network to process. Once 
processed, the information can be passed with the converged 
voice network to the forward deployed Marine. The supported 
Marine becomes lighter, smaller, faster, and smarter with 
the same equipment he has carried and trained with for 
decades. 
4. Employment of Network Nodes  
The ability to establish network nodes to properly 
network voice communications is important to consider.  The 
questions of responsibility of such nodes should be 
investigated.  Given the current T/O structure of the 
Marine Corps the authors have concluded Distributed 
Operations should in most cases, employ network nodes at 
the closest exchange server location within the 
organization.  In most cases this would be the battalion 
command post but could reside at the regimental or division 
level of the organization.  This is not to say a DO unit 
must enter the network at a given echelon but this is the 
most likely scenario for DO. 
From the DO platoon perspective, RF-to-IP node 
integration would occur where habitual relationships are 
already formed.  In most cases this would be the battalion 
communications platoon.  The communications platoon would 
bear the responsibility of ensuring all channels were 
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configured as required.  Prior to mission launch detailed 
communications planning would be required to determine the 
best method of bridging into the IP network infrastructure.  
DO mission planning may have to include additional 
attachments whose primary mission is to establish and 
maintain long-haul communications with the IP network. 
5. Power Considerations  
The authors believe a mobile platform is most 
desirable for establishing long-haul communications.  
Whether a DO platoon employs IEEE 802.16 technology, SATCOM 
or Mesh, the ability to have a stable platform where power 
generation is reliable and continuous is most desirable.  
As of the date of this research MCWL has expressed the 
desire to keep Distributed Operations vehicular independent 
but have not ruled it out.   
In February 2006 one of the authors of this thesis 
attended a DO logistics conference in Quantico Virginia.  
Combat Service Support (CSS) for DO does raise serious 
concerns about how self sustaining a DO platoon can or must 
be in order for mission success.  As the date of this 
research several areas of research had been identified for 
study.  The conference generated serious discussion about 
power required for DO.  In the short term, DO must use the 
technology available today. A mobile communications 
platform would greatly increase the effectiveness of a DO 
Platoons ability to communicate.  From this platform, the 
DO units could recharge batteries and employ more powerful 
communications assets as needed.  The technology in this 
thesis could easily be adapted to fit into a mobile 
platform.   
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6. Concept of Operations  
The main purpose of this section is to examine the 
advantages and disadvantages of possible network 
architecture scenarios for DO.  In each scenario the 
integration of legacy radio systems with an established IP 
network is the baseline.  The use of four different long-
haul links is used to show how each network topology would 
unfold.  In all cases the intent to maximize the number of 
users (units).  The ability for DO to have constant and 
continuous communications is vital to its mission.  
Therefore it is assumed that all entities have access to 
and are fully integrated into the larger IP network 
infrastructure.  
a. Overview 
The DO platoon must have a reliable reach back 
capability in order to facilitate its communication 
requirements.  Diagram 8 details in broad terms what the 
logical network topology could look like.  Each unit in the 
IP network is only logically connected.  Some units may be 
several miles from each other but still are connected via 
the network.  The diagram indicates DO platoon merely 
establishes a connection into the larger IP network.  In 
this case four different connections are considered. IEEE 
802.16, UHFSATCOM/VHF retransmission, Iridium SATCOM and 
Mesh are all considered for the long-haul communications 
bridge for DO.  Each scenario uses Twisted Pair WAVE to 
bridge legacy voice communications to multiple 
clients/units on the network.  Each unit then could run 
WAVE Desktop communicator application to speak directly to 




Diagram 11.   Concept of Operations – Overview 
 
All scenarios use existing legacy equipment to 
facilitate communications and introduce new technology to 
fill the gaps in the existing communications suite.  Each 
scenario approaches this challenge from the platoon 
perspective and the network perspective, thereby tying in 
those entities that will support the DO mission.  In this 
case the DO platoon will rely mainly on its parent infantry 
battalion to provide the network node interface and server 
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management.  The authors believe this would be a reasonable 
assumption based on the current T/O of the Marine Corps. 
b. Scenario One 
Diagram 9 uses IEEE 802.16 technology to 
facilitate PtP long-haul communications into the network.  
Each user runs WAVE Desktop communicator for voice 
communications.  The WAVE server resides at the next higher 
echelon.  The NXU2 and legacy radio does not need to reside 
where the server is but merely be connected to the network.  
In this scenario the NXU2 and PRC-117F VHF radio is located 
with the IEEE 802.16 link.  As long as the connection is 
maintained with the IEEE 802.16 radio, the DO platoon is 
free to maneuver about their battlespace within the max 
range of their VHF assets.  If the DO platoon moves outside 
the VHF range, then the signal is lost and communications 
are lost to higher or supporting echelons. If the IEEE 
802.16 link is lost, the DO Platoon maintains internal VHF 





Diagram 12.   IEEE 802.16 Link into the Network 
 
Advantages: 
• The DO platoon can maintain internal 
communications if the IEEE 802.16 link is lost.  
Thus alternate means of communications could be 
established to higher, such as UHF SATCOM. 
• The DO platoon can speak directly to multiple 
units at the same time.  Each supporting unit 
would have real time collaboration of voice 
communications. 
• Clients/Units can have duel use of existing 
computer assets since each laptop running Wave 
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Desktop communicator could be used for other 
purposes as well.  For example Radio Operators 
could monitor network traffic while updating a 
unit data base.   
• Intelligence from multiple sources could be 
directly communicated from S-2 representatives to 
the DO platoon.   Any qualified individual could 
merely key the radio on their computer to speak 
to the DO Platoon. 
• Call for fires for artillery and air support 
could be facilitated from the gun-line directly 
to the platoon.  De-confliction of fires can be 
done while the Fire Support Coordinator (FSC) is 
monitoring voice communications via the network. 
• Communications are transparent to the individual 
DO platoon member.  Little or no additional radio 
configuration is required. 
Disadvantages: 
• If the IEEE 802.16 link is lost then 
communications are lost outside of the platoon 
• Establishing and maintaining an IEEE 802.16 link 
is terrain dependant.  This link must be PtP for 
extended distances.  The DO platoon need not be 
physically located with the IEEE 802.16 radio but 
must not exceed the VHF range of the PRC-117f 
radio connected to the NXU2 and the IEEE 802.16 
radio.  Additionally it is unlikely the DO 
headquarters would leave important communications 
unattended therefore some size element would have 
to be stood up to guard the network node.  This 
would either come from the supporting higher unit 
or the DO platoon itself. 
• The IEEE 802.16 link is a single point of failure 
and is subject to enemy fires or exploitation if 
discovered. 
• Any network node would require additional power 
consumption.  Any network nodes in the field 




• The IEEE 802.16 link does have range limitations 
necessitating the need for detailed 
communications planning and detailed link budget 
analysis. 
c. Scenario Two 
Diagram 10 integrates existing capabilities of 
the legacy radios carried by the DO platoon and network 
node integration.  Here the DO platoon uses existing 
VHF/UHF assets to communicate to higher.  The use of 
retransmission blends the VHF signal with a UHF SATCOM 
signal.  The DO platoon can continue to use their VHF 
assets internal to the platoon while one radio acts a 
retransmission node to carry the blended signal over a 25 
KHz SATCOM link back to higher.  There the signal is 
converted back to VHF and linked into the NXU2 where the 
signal is digitally sampled and put into IP form.  The WAVE 









• Only additional equipment required is the 
appropriate retransmission cable for the PRC-117F 
• Worldwide communications for DO platoon 
• DO platoon maintains its maneuverability within 
the VHF radio sphere. 
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• Additional PRC-117 may have to be carried for 
this mission, adding to the weight the existing 
combat load. 
Disadvantages: 
• 25 KHz channel availability may not be available 
to support DO operations.  In most cases there is 
limited capacity for dedicated SATCOM channels. 
• Mobility of the DO headquarters (HQ) element may 
be hampered by maintaining static network node in 
the field. 
• Additional training required for retransmission 
operations. 
 
d. Scenario Three 
Diagram 11 uses the ETCS system has main long 
haul link.  The audio port from the ETCS is connected to 
the NXU2 then bridged into the IP network.  The 2,400 Bps 
bandwidth of ETCS does not become a limiting factor due to 
the transport of the raw audio from the iridium handset 
over the network. The handset is not used as a transporter 
of data. The voice traffic from the audio pins of the 
iridium handset are converted to IP packets in the same way 
as it is done in the tactical radios. DO platoon could then 
maneuver uninhibited through out the battlespace while all 
supporting entities would be connected via the network. 
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Diagram 14.   ETCS Linked into Network Node 
 
Advantages: 
• Continuous satellite connectivity for the DO 
platoon.  Worldwide coverage in most cases. 
• No additional equipment required.  Entities are 
bridged via the network 
• Continuous voice communications  




• ETCS system is not reliable in rolling and steep 
terrain therefore complicating voice 
communications at the network level. 
• Limited mobility due to possible signal loss of 
ETCS system.  Because the system is SATCOM 
dependant, cover and concealment is jeopardized 
at the expense of continuous communications. 
 
e. Scenario Four 
This scenario uses mesh enabled equipment and 
legacy radio systems over a common mesh network. The DO 
platoon can maintain connectivity over a variety of 
methods.  Diagram 12 depicts several network nodes that 
extend the network of the platoon.  The use of UAVs, 
balloons or PtP links work together to provide coverage for 
the DO platoon.  Here the VHF legacy assets connect to a 
NXU2.  From there the NXU2 is connected to the mesh 
infrastructure via wireless mesh bridge.  The mesh 
infrastructure is connected to the IP network where this 
information is extended to all clients/units as needed via 




Diagram 15.   VHF and Mesh Equipment Bridged into IP 
network via Mesh Cloud 
 
DO platoon members have the option to used mobile 
mesh devices along with their legacy voice assets.  This 
method may provide greater flexibility and a wider range of 
communication opportunities.  The mesh network is extended 
by multiple network nodes used throughout the battlespace.  
Therefore wherever a DO unit moves, their RF voice 
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communications can move across the mesh network.  The 
authors believe this may be one way to bridge current 
legacy equipment along with emerging mesh technology.  Once 
mesh technology matures then more traditional 
communications such as VHF could be phased out over time.  
Until this occurs, this blend of old and new technology may 
help bridge changing technologies. 
 
Advantages: 
• DO platoon can now use the latest mesh technology 
in conjunction with their legacy radio assets.  
Each mesh device extends the coverage of the 
network. 
• DO squad members have continuous PLI information 
as well as other mesh users. 
• Redundancy of vital communications is achieved.  
If mesh communications are lost between squads 
then legacy radio systems can be used. 
• Clients/Units can run mesh software application 
and Desktop communicator simultaneously on their 
existing computer assets.  Multiple uses of 
limited resources are achieved. 
Disadvantages: 
• Mesh devices are LOS communications.  If LOS is 
lost then communications are lost.  Therefore 
terrain is the largest challenge for mesh 
devices.  Legacy radio systems have more graceful 
degradation of signal and work better in NLOS 
conditions. 
• Complicated network.  Required more training of 
communicators to trouble shoot network problems. 
• Wave software currently not designed to 
specifically incorporate mesh technology.  The 
authors had to manipulate the systems to 
communicate as needed.   
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE 
RESEARCH 
A. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this research was to examine how to 
better utilize legacy ground radio assets within an ever 
growing tactical IP network infrastructure.  This research 
points out the tactical network is growing and reaching 
those entities that previously lacked connectivity and 
access.  This trend is only likely to continue.  For DO 
this means greater access to network resources. 
DO present several communication challenges. Some of 
which require new technologies and the rethinking of how 
older technologies are employed.  DO units may have to 
operate independently and may rely on several entities 
outside traditional organizational structures for fires, 
intelligence and logistical support.  If this is the case, 
then the Marine Corps should integrate proven 
communications equipment with technology that can integrate 
those assets into a common tactical IP network.  This 
research investigates and demonstrates this can be 
accomplished. 
The authors believe traditional tactical voice 
communication should and will continue to dominant 
information flow on the battlefield.  This is extremely 
important for DO since contact with the enemy may be most 
imminent and support from higher may have time 
restrictions.  By bridging radio communications across our 
tactical internet, DO units will benefit the most since 
multiple entities can monitor traffic and communicate as 
needed from several different physical locations on the 
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network.  Additionally more efficient use of limited 
computer assets or other IP based devices could be used to 
communicate to DO units. 
The experiments conducted at Camp Roberts simulated 
how such a network would work across various mediums.  
Initial tests demonstrated mesh technologies across varied 
terrain and dissimilar networks.  The use of near space 
balloons and IEEE 802.16 technology investigated some long-
haul communications opportunities for DO. 
The thrust of this thesis focused on bridging legacy 
radio assets, such as PRC-117F, PRC-148 and PRC-119F across 
tactical data networks.  Experiments included the use of 
Twisted Pair WAVE technology and the JPS NXU2-A which 
enabled multiple users to communicate via laptop computers, 
CISCO IP phones or personal digital assistants (PDAs) to 
military tactical radios in the field.  In some cases 
distances exceeded 100 miles while not restricting user’s 
mobility in the field.  The uses of IEEE 802.16, IEEE 
802.11A and mesh technology were used to facilitate 
tactical voice communications thereby demonstrating 
interoperability between older technology and emerging 
technology.  Highlights of the experiments came when users 
could communicate freely with their tactical VHF/UHF assets 
through the network to multiple IP devices located at the 
TOC in Camp Roberts and over 100 miles to Naval 
Postgraduate School in Monterey. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
1. Additional Field Study  
The research conducted in this thesis is centered on 
employment by small ground units. There exists extensive 
application of the above concepts across the spectrum of 
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joint level command and control. Further research is 
suggested not only in the enabling technologies but also in 
the employment of the capabilities that are available. 
Extending the voice network of a small ground unit across 
the resources of a joint and coalition force opens the door 
for a multitude of practical application. This capability 
could have extensive usefulness for intelligence activities 
for situational awareness and information gathering. 
Requests for intelligence gathering can be greatly 
increased as well with a direct connection to the 
individual on the ground. Further research is also 
suggested in enabling fire support missions with this 
technology. Having every element of a fire mission aware of 
the immediate coordination from ground unit to executing 
element could greatly increase time on target as well as 
the overall safety of the mission.  
Furthermore, research opportunities exist to analyze 
the detailed requirements needed of a tactical IP network 
to support this type of a network. Multicast 
implementation, quality of service issues, jitter and 
latency management, and other network implementation items 
of study are needed. Policy and procedure mechanisms could 
also be studied to better implement such a network with 
connections to a number of different services and 
organizations.  
Outside of DOD, future efforts should be made to 
establish gateways into civilian network voice/data 
infrastructures where first responders such as, police, 
fire-rescue or relief organizations may need to communicate 
with military units.  For example, it may not be 
unreasonable to assume that military units will need to 
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integrate with civilian law enforcement in the case of 
natural disasters or terrorist attacks.  The ability to 
bridge dissimilar networks on the tactical or first-
responder level is a real problem.  This body of research 
stayed within the context of DO, but could be applied to 
those entities that must accomplish similar objectives. 
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APPENDIX A  
A. DO PLATOON SURVEY 
Survey Consent Agreement: 
 
Introduction. You are invited to participate in a survey 
regarding Distributive Operations.  
 
Procedures. If I agree to participate in this study, I 
understand I will be provided with an explanation of the 
purposes of the research, a description of the procedures 
to be used, identification of any experimental procedures, 
and the expected duration of my participation. 
 
Risks and Benefits. I understand that this survey does not 
involve greater than minimal risk and involves no known 
reasonably foreseeable risks or hazards greater than those 
encountered in everyday life. I have also been informed of 
any benefits to myself or to others that may reasonably be 
expected as a result of this research. 
 
Compensation. I understand that no tangible reward will be 
given. I understand that a copy of the research results 
will be available at the conclusion of the experiment. 
 
Confidentiality & Privacy Act. I understand that all 
records of this study will be kept confidential and that my 
privacy will be safeguarded. No information will be 
publicly accessible which could identify me as a 
participant, and I will be identified only as a code number 
on all research forms. I understand that records of my 
participation will be maintained by NPS for five years, 
after which they will be destroyed.  
 
Voluntary Nature of the Study. I understand that my 
participation is strictly voluntary, and if I agree to 
participate, I am free to withdraw at any time without 
prejudice.  
 
Points of Contact. I understand that if I have any 
questions or comments regarding this project upon the 
completion of my participation, I should contact the JC4I 
Program Officer, LtCol Pfeiffer USAF at (831)656-3635.  
 
Statement of Consent. I have read and understand the above 
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information. I have asked all questions and have had my 
questions answered. I agree to participate in this survey. I will be 







Years of Service: 
#Number of Combat Tours/Where: 
 
1. Communications Radio Operator Experience: (Circle which) 
• Low/Med/High/Very High 
• Low – Push to Talk 
• Med – Load Fill, Program, Change Batteries 
• High – Build Antennas, Retrans Ops, Data and Voice 
• Very High – Operated different types of platforms (HF, 
VHF and UHF/SATCOM).  Operate mobile platforms and 
networks. 
 
2. In your experience or knowledge of Distributed 
Operations, what factors do you believe limit the success 
of DO the most?  Rank in order the most limited (=1) to 
least (=5) 
  Lack of training in weapons and unit level tactics 
  Lack of suitable communication assets 
  Lack of fire support 
  Lack of suitable Intel 







3. How important is intra squad communications i.e. every 
Marine possess a radio? 
a. Not important 
b. Somewhat important (some impact on mission success) 
c. Important (key to mission success) 







4. How many communication assets should a DO squad possess 
and realistically operate? 
a. 1-2 
b. 3-4 






5. How important is it to have a “data” capability (send and 
receive digital information) at the platoon level or 
lower? 
a. Not important 
b. Somewhat important (some impact on mission success) 
c. Important (key to mission success) 






6. Should Marines be equipped with digital devices that show 
a digital map and position location of its members?  If 
so, who should have this capability? 
a. Every Marines 
b. Fireteam Leaders    
c. Squad Leaders 






7. Should all Marines in a DO platoon be required to 
install, operate and maintain all radio communication 
assets in their procession and be required to maintain 











8. What types of data capability (information other than 
voice communications) is important for Distributed 
Operations? 
a. Chat – Short messages back and forth 
b. Email – Documents, longer messages 
c. Documents – Word or PowerPoint files 






9.  How important is it to be linked into a larger network 
with your communication assets? i.e. SIPR/NIPR 
a.   Not important 
b. Somewhat important (some impact on mission success) 
c. Important (key to mission success) 






10.  DO platoon could often operate at the furthest reaches 
of vital fire/air support.  Should every squad/fireteam 
have the ability to call for fire/CAS? 
a.   Yes 
b. No 






11. How challenging is it to learn the current 
communication suite of assets for the average Marine? 
a. Not Difficult 
b. Difficult 







12. What comfort level do you have working with computers 
(laptops or desktops) and or computer type devices (cell 
phone, videogames) 
a. No experience  
b. Some experience (Email, Instant messaging) 
c. Good experience (Regular use) 







13. What kind of information do you want “pushed” to you 
on a regular basis during operations?  Please rank in 
order of importance (1 = most, 6 = least) 
  Latest enemy situation report 
  Latest friendly situation report 
  Position location of unit member’s location 
  Location of air craft on station 
  Logistic supply report 
  Status of fire support 
 
14. Considering the heavy reliance of high power 
communication assets, do you believe DO is limited or 
constrained by the use of vehicle communications? 
a. YES 
b. NO 
c. Don’t know 
 
15. What other factors not covered by this survey, impact 





















































A. WAVE MANAGEMENT AND SERVER AND NXU CONFIGURATION  
 
Figure 45.   Wave Management Server 
 
Figure 45 depicts the home page for the WAVE 
Management server. The menu options for configuring the 
server are located to the left of the page. Access to 
configuration items on the Media Server is also available 
from this GUI. The WAVE application operates by licensed 
options and access to the different capabilities is based 
on having a validated license file on the server for 
purchased software options. The management menu options 
give access to the license file and shows the available 
licenses loaded on the machine.  
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Figure 46.   WAVE Channel Configuration 
 
Figure 46 depicts the channel configuration page. Each 
channel corresponds to a specific voice network. In this 
case, the Battalion Fires Net is configured with a 
multicast address of 239.111.111.111 using port 22224. The 
instant replay option allows the WAVE Desktop Communicator 
user to replay the last two minutes of a voice 
transmission. The Proxy Session is a configuration option 
which allows the channel to operate as unicast rather than 
multicast. This option was used during our research with a 
Mesh architecture where the wireless networking cards used 
did not support multicast. Using the Proxy Session allowed 




Figure 47.   WAVE Media Server Configuration 
 
Figure 47 depicts the configuration page for the WAVE 
Media Server. In our research application the Media Server 
software was loaded on the same computer as the WAVE 
Management Server. The Media Server handles the mixing of 
audio streams and interfacing for the different channels or 
sessions assigned to those audio streams.  
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Figure 48.   Wave Media Server Configuration Continued 
 
Figure 48 is the continuation of the Media server 
screen. The screenshot shows there are 10 users allowed 
access to the server at any given time. This number can be 
raised or lowered by the administrator based on the number 
of licenses available and the amount of bandwidth available 
on the network.  
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Figure 49.   WAVE Session Configuration 
 
Figure 49 shows the session configuration screen. Each 
session can be configured to give users access to different 
channels or VOIP devices. Each session can be configured 
for access by different users as determined by the 





Figure 50.   WAVE Session Configuration Continued 
 
Figure 50 shows a session with two channels assigned 
to it. The Battalion Operations Radio Net and the Cisco IP 
Phone channels are depicted. The NXU-2A is also shown as an 
interface allowing the audio from the NXU-2A to be accessed 
by this session.  
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B. NXU CONFIGURATION - 
 
Figure 51.   NXU-2A Configuration Utility 
 
Figure 51 depicts the web based configuration 
interface for the NXU-2A. The VOIP port specified is the 
port used by the WAVE Server for interfacing the NXU-2A. 
The 13Kbps vocoder was chosen based not only for minimal 
bandwidth usage but also as the setting recommended for the 
WAVE server while interfacing the NXU-2A. The VMR setting 
is required for certain tactical radios due to their being 
no COR circuit used to initiate a key. VMR is a voice 
activated setting that opens the circuit once an audible 
voice signal is detected from the radio by the NXU-2A. 
There are also potentiometer settings on the back of the 
NXU-2A that allow the user to change input levels of the 
audio signal coming from the radio to the NXU-2a. 
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Figure 52.   WAVE Configuration Utility Continued 
 
Figure 52 depicts the web based utility page of the 
NXU-2A that is used for inputting settings. The IP address 
is statically assigned for the NXU-2A with the remote IP 
address referring to the WAVE Media Server. The remote port 
is the voice port used by the WAVE Media server in this 
application. The Rx Boost Mode was used with the AN/PRC-117 
and the AN/PRC-119 to allow for higher audio levels over 
the network. The unit must be set up as a server when 
connecting to a WAVE Media server.  
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APPENDIX D 
A. SOLAR WINDS BANDWITH MEASURMENTS 
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